Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus issue under the jdp government: myth or reality by Bodur, Sevinç & Bodur, Sevinc
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 
TOWARDS CYPRUS ISSUE UNDER THE JDP GOVERNMENT:  
MYTH OR REALITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
SEVĐNÇ BODUR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Social Sciences 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
 
 
 
 
Sabancı University 
August 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS 
ISSUE UNDER THE JDP GOVERNMENT: MYTH OR REALITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPROVED BY: 
 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç              …………………………. 
 
(Dissertation Supervisor) 
 
Prof. Dr. Ayşe Öncü                                ………………………. 
 
 
Assist. Prof. Yaprak Gürsoy Dipşar         ………..……………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DATE OF APPROVAL:  …………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Sevinç Bodur 2008 
 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my love and my family 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS  
CYPRUS ISSUE UNDER THE JDP GOVERNMENT: MYTH OR REALITY 
 
 
SEVĐNÇ BODUR 
 
M.A. in European Studies Program, Thesis, 2008 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler Baç 
 
 
Keywords: Europeanization, Turkish Foreign Policy, Cyprus Issue, JDP Government, 
security interests vs. EU membership 
 
 
After Justice and Development Party came to power on 3 November 2002 
elections, the JDP government has made the EU membership as a policy priority, and 
tied Turkey’s accession to the EU with the solution of the Cyprus problem. In this 
respect, this study aims to assess whether a change in Turkish foreign policy towards 
Cyprus has occurred since 2002 and if so whether this change is related to the Turkish 
accession process. Although previous governments recognize the Cyprus issue as a vital 
national security interest that can not be sacrificed for the EU membership, the JDP 
government has developed its Cyprus policy in order to overcome the challenges 
against the EU membership. The external incentive for a change in Turkish foreign 
policy towards Cyprus is the motivation for the EU membership. In this regard, the JDP 
government has developed its discourse over Cyprus compatible with the EU rhetoric. 
However, the weakening of credibility of the EU rewards and threats slowed down the 
“Europeanization” process in Turkey and “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy 
towards Cyprus remain solely in rhetoric despite the initial pro-activism of the JDP 
government in the earlier phase of accession negotiations.    
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ÖZET 
 
 
AKP HÜKÜMETĐ ALTINDA TÜRK DIŞ POLĐTĐKASININ KIBRIS 
SORUNUNA YAKLAŞIMININ AVRUPALILAŞMASI: EFSANE YA DA 
GERÇEK  
 
 
SEVĐNÇ BODUR 
 
Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2008 
 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Avrupalılaşma, Türk Dış Politikası, Kıbrıs Sorunu, AKP 
Hükümeti, güvenlik çıkarları AB üyeliğine karşı 
 
 
3 Kasım 2002 seçimleriyle Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi iktidara geldikten sonra, AKP 
hükümeti AB üyeliğini politika önceliği yaptı ve Türkiye’nin AB’ye katılımını Kıbrıs 
sorunun çözümü ile ilintilendirdi. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma 2002’den beri Türk dış 
politikasının Kıbrıs’a yaklaşımında bir değişim olup olmadığını, eğer bir değişim varsa 
bu değişimin Türkiye’nin katılım süreciyle ilişkisini tayin etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Her 
ne kadar önceki hükümetler Kıbrıs’ı AB üyeliği için feda edilemeyecek bir milli 
güvenlik unsuru olarak kabul etse de, AKP hükümeti Kıbrıs politikasını AB üyeliği 
karşısındaki engelleri kaldırmaya yönelik geliştirmektedir. Türk dış politikasının 
Kıbrıs’a yaklaşımındaki bu değişimin arkasındaki dış teşvik AB üyeliğidir. Bu 
bağlamda, AKP hükümeti Kıbrıs söylemlerini AB’nin söylevlerine uyumlu bir şekilde 
geliştirmektedir. Fakat AB ödül ve tehditlerinin güvenilirliğinin azalması Türkiye’deki 
“Avrupalılaşma” sürecini de yavaşlatmaktadır ve AKP hükümetinin katılım 
müzakerelerinin ilk zamanlarındaki inisiyatifi ele alan tutumuna rağmen Türk dış 
politikasının Kıbrıs’a yaklaşımındaki Avrupalılaşma yalnızca söylevdeki değişimde 
kalmaktadır.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Turkey has been negotiating for membership in the European Union since 
October 2005. The impact of the accession negotiations has been felt in a number of 
areas in Turkish policy-including economics, politics and foreign policymaking.  This is 
to be expected as the European Union is an important actor which encourages and 
promotes change in its members as well as in those countries that aim at accession.  
This is why there is an important body of literature that investigates the EU’s impact on 
bringing about political change. The domestic impact of the European Union (EU) is 
referred to as Europeanization in European integration literature. “Europeanization” is 
generally defined as the adoption and implementation of EU rules and regulations. In 
order to become an EU member, it is necessary to make reforms in line with the acquis 
communautaire, 80,000 pages of EU legislation.1 ‘Conditionality’ is at the center of 
“Europeanization.” Membership, the ultimate reward, depends on the adoption and 
implementation of the EU rules and regulations.2  
Turkey as a candidate country has been undertaking an ongoing and 
unprecedented political reform process since 2001. This reform process has been 
associated with Turkey’s relations with the European Union. Many scholars have tried 
to analyze the link between the Turkey’s reform process and its path to the EU and how 
this reform process has been strengthened by the external EU anchor. This stimulating 
discussion has engendered a growing literature questioning how Turkey has succeeded 
in transforming itself in order to achieve EU membership.  As a result, this thesis aims 
to explore the impact of the European Union on policymaking in Turkey. In particular, 
this thesis will analyze the EU’s impact on the transformation of Turkish foreign policy 
                                                 
1
 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Introduction: Conceptualizing the 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe,” in The Europeanization of Central and 
Eastern Europe, eds. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedemeier (USA: Cornell 
University Press, 2005): 1-28. 
 
2 Kemal Kirişçi, “The limits of conditionality and Europeanization: Turkey’s dilemmas 
in adopting the EU acquis on asylum,” EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, 
17-19 May 2007.  
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toward Cyprus. This is particularly important as Cyprus and the Turkish involvement in 
the Cyprus problem has been a crucial factor determining Turkey’s relations with the 
EU as well as its accession negotiations. 
This thesis aims at uncovering whether a change in Turkish foreign policy 
towards Cyprus has occurred with the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) coming to 
power with on the  3 November 2002 elections. This is important because the JDP has 
made Turkey’s membership a policy priority and since Turkey’s accession to the EU is 
ultimately tied to the solution of the Cyprus problem, radical change in traditional 
Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus would be expected.  As a result, the JDP has put 
forth a position that it claims to be as a radical break from traditional Turkish foreign 
policy towards Cyprus. This major transformation is clearly associated with Turkish 
accession to the EU as there are no other internal and/or external factors giving rise to 
such a foreign policy change. Thus, this thesis will analyze how Turkey has been able to 
transform its foreign policy towards Cyprus under the JDP government for the purposes 
of EU membership and the extent to which the credibility of the EU has played a role in 
the transformation of Turkish foreign policy toward Cyprus. 
The main rationale behind policy changes is that candidate countries have to 
adjust their policies vis-à-vis the demands and priorities of the EU. Public policy 
makers of candidate countries transform domestic policies in line with the EU acquis in 
order to be rewarded with the EU membership. On the other hand, transformation 
process has worked much faster in some candidate states than in others. This unequal 
adaptation process has aroused interest in what drives reception and implementation of 
the EU acquis in candidate countries.3 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have asserted 
that the “credibility of threats and rewards is a core prerequisite” of any effective 
transformation process.4  This is an important insight as one could deduce that the EU’s 
ability to impact change is ultimately tied to its credibility in the eyes of the candidate 
country, in this case, in Turkey. 
When one looks at the literature on Europeanization, it becomes obvious that the 
vast body of the research is on the adjustment of internal policies to those of the EU.  In 
other words, in contrast to “Europeanization” of domestic policies, “Europeanization” 
                                                 
3 Ibid, 2. 
 
4 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 33. 
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of foreign policies is highly problematic. This might be due to the fact that the EU itself 
has yet to form a unified voice in its foreign policy whereas the main standards in 
domestic politics are relatively more established.  The main problem in terms of 
“Europeanization” of foreign policy is that the EU is not a unified state actor with 
identifiable ‘Europeanized interests.’ Despite practices of policy consultation and 
coordination, the EU still has a flexible and disaggregated series of patterns, 
arrangements, and institutions which express a collective yet pluralistic identity.5 Thus, 
the power of the EU to affect national policy in the policy areas including foreign 
policy, where there is no EU directives and regulations, depends on the strength of 
credibility of threats and rewards.6 Moreover, credibility of the EU is essential to be 
able to exercise its normative power. The widespread discourse in the EU with respect 
to legitimizing its policies is centers on   how integration will help in overcoming 
conflicts and in maintaining peace and stability. However, exactly how and under what 
conditions integration will contribute to concluding peaceful transformation of border 
conflicts and the development of the good neighborly relations are important questions 
that need to be discussed.7 The inconsistency between the EU’s rhetoric and its behavior 
undermines the EU’s normative power. This is why the focus of this thesis on the 
relationship between the uncertain future of Turkey’s accession to the EU and the 
Europeanization process in Turkish foreign policy will be a novel contribution to the 
Europeanization and Turkey-EU literature as well as the normative power literature. 
In order to understand the link between credibility and transformative power of 
the EU, this thesis intends to explore whether there is “Europeanization” of Turkish 
foreign policy in action or solely at the rhetorical level. Thus, the discursive inclinations 
of the JDP politicians, especially the key actors within the party and government, will 
be the main focus of this study. Moreover, by searching for gaps among rhetoric, stated 
                                                 
5 Reuben Wong, “The Europeanization of Foreign Policy,” in International Relations 
and the European Union, eds. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005): 134-153. 
 
6 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 33. 
 
7 Mathias Albert, Thomas Diez, and Stephan Stetter, “The European Union and Border 
Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration,” International Organization 60 
(2006): 563-593. 
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motivation, material interests, and policy outcomes, this thesis plans not only on 
discovering the extent to which foreign policy makers have succeeded in adopting a 
“Europeanized” discourse but also on exploring whether “Europeanization” in discourse 
has been turned into “Europeanized” policy outcomes. In this regard, the impact of 
credibility of threats and rewards originated from the perspective EU membership on 
the transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus both in rhetoric and in 
realpolitik under the JDP government will be examined. 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is laid out in Chapter 1. It should be 
underlined that the complex nature of the relationship between the EU and Turkey as 
well as the long-lasting and problematic structure of the Cyprus dispute necessitates the 
employment of various theoretical approaches in order to reach a comprehensive 
understanding of the ongoing dynamics and transformations on Turkish foreign policy 
toward the Cyprus conflict. The thesis will assess whether a change in Turkish foreign 
policy has occurred since 2002 and, if so, whether this change is related to the Turkish 
accession process. In this regard, the “external incentives model” developed by 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier will help to understand and explain the far-reaching 
transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus given Turkey’s desire for  EU 
membership and to what extent credibility of the EU affects the development of 
“Europeanized” discourse on Cyprus issue.  
On the other hand, in order to determine whether there has been a real change in 
Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus or simply a rhetorical one, it is necessary to 
analyze the extent to which “Europeanized” discourse has turned into “Europeanized” 
policy outcomes. In this respect, Smith’s analysis will contribute to understanding the 
degree to which the “Europeanized” discourse has developed into action and how the 
European rules and procedures are incorporated into the JDP’s policies towards 
Cyprus.8 However, it is also important to see that even if changes in approach toward 
Cyprus are only rhetorical, this is also a major accomplishment as such change can 
precede and encourage policy changes. In this respect, Diez’s categorization of the EU’s 
pathways to transforming the border conflict will help make it clear as to whether or not 
the EU integration process has had a positive impact on the movement of the conflict 
                                                 
8 Michael Smith, “Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy,” 
Journal of European Public Policy 7 (2000): 613-631. 
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away from a stage of a greater conflict intensity to stages of lower intensity as a result 
of “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus under the JDP 
government.9  
Chapter 2 analyzes the historical evolution of the Turkish foreign policy towards 
Cyprus as well as the involvement of the EU in this conflict.  This chapter investigates 
the principles and major turning points in the Turkey-Cyprus-EU triangle. In particular, 
it will try to understand the developments and the nationalist rhetoric in the 1990s. In 
Chapter 3, the thesis will conduct a rhetorical analysis of the main actors based on 
official speeches of the representatives of the JDP government. On the other hand, in 
order to understand discourse transition under the JDP government, Chapter 3 will 
compare the discourse developed by the JDP government with the discourse developed 
by the previous coalition government of the Democratic Left Party, National Action 
Party and Motherland Party. Moreover, Chapter 3 will carry out a brief discourse 
analysis of other actors who are essential to the determination of Turkish foreign policy 
towards Cyprus: the main opposition party - the Republican People’s Party, the 
Presidency of Turkish Republic and the Turkish Armed Forces in order to understand 
whether there has been a divergence from traditional discourse, as well as whether a 
compatibility with European discourse has ensued.   Moreover, by using the “external 
incentives model” developed by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, this thesis will 
discuss whether policy makers of the JDP government use “Europeanized” discourse in 
order to be rewarded with the EU membership or to avoid being  penalized by being 
kept outside the EU. In this regard, rhetorical analysis will answer whether there is an 
equally important material need that EU membership provides which could be thought 
of as a trade off with the security interests in Cyprus.  It is also important to assess 
whether all political actors in Turkey believe in the material interest that the EU 
accession will bring.  
In addition, by using Smith’s analysis, Chapter 4 will analyze to what extent 
“Europeanized” discourse has turned into “Europeanized” policy outcomes. According 
to Smith, there are four major indicators to be used in analyzing domestic adaptation 
with regard to foreign policy: elite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, 
constitutional change, and increase in public support for the Europeanization of foreign 
                                                 
9
 Albert, Diez, and Stetter, 563-565. 
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policy. Thus, based on these indicators, this thesis will try to analyze that the extent to 
which a “Europeanized” discourse has turned into action.10 On the other hand, it is also 
important to recognize that even if these changes vis-à-vis Cyprus are merely rhetorical, 
this, too, is also a major accomplishment since rhetorical change can precede and 
engender policy changes. In this regard, Diez’s categorization of the EU’s pathways to 
transform the border conflict will become particularly helpful to discovering whether 
the EU integration process has had a positive impact on the movement of the conflict 
from a stage of greater conflict intensity to stages of lower intensity. It will also be 
beneficial to analyze the impact of the credibility of the EU on transformation of 
Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus. Finally, the Conclusion will summarize the 
findings elaborated in this thesis and try to conclude whether a change in Turkish 
foreign policy towards Cyprus has occurred since 2002 and if so whether this change is 
related to the Turkish accession process. Moreover, an attempt will be made to 
understand the extent to which uncertainty of eventual EU membership affects the 
transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus.11   
In brief, the thesis aims to assess whether a change in Turkish foreign policy 
towards Cyprus has occurred since 2002 and if so whether this change is related to the 
Turkish accession process. The involvement of Turkish government in Cyprus is 
explored through material security needs and interests; then a question emerges as to 
whether there is an equally important material need that EU membership provides – one 
that could be thought of as a trade off with the security interests in Cyprus.  It is also 
important to assess whether all political actors in Turkey believe in the material interest 
that the EU accession will bring.  In this respect, the analysis of the change in Turkish 
foreign policy towards Cyprus will also testify to the impact of the credibility of the 
signals that come from the EU in terms of threats and rewards. Thus, the thesis will 
assess whether there has been  a real change in Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus 
or whether any change have only been in terms of rhetoric. It is also important to 
understand that even if changes are simply   rhetorical, this, too, can be seen as a major 
accomplishment since rhetoric change can precede and create policy changes.  
 
                                                 
10 Smith, 613-631. 
 
11 Albert, Diez, and Stetter, 563-593.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
EUROPEANIZATION THEORY IN PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
 
In an analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy towards Cyprus, it is necessary to 
adopt a theoretical framework, such as the one covered in this chapter. In order to reach 
a comprehensive understanding of the relations in the Turkish-Cyprus-EU triangle, it is 
necessary to employ various theoretical approaches, most notably Europeanization 
theory. Thus, in this chapter, a brief background on the theories of Europeanization will 
be provided. Particularly, the “external incentives model” developed by 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, Smith’s analysis of major indicators to analyze the 
domestic adaptation to foreign policy, and Diez’ categorization of the EU’s pathways to 
transform the border conflict will be covered in this theoretical chapter. The concept of 
“Europeanization” is useful in order to understand the emergence, development and 
impacts of a European, institutionally-ordered system of governance.12 The common 
definition of the “Europeanization” is the transformation of politics at the domestic 
level.13 However, “Europeanization” does not have any single precise or stable 
meaning.14 It is a process of structural change, affecting actors, institutions, ideas, and 
interests. It has a dynamic structure whose effects are not necessarily permanent or 
irreversible. On the contrary, its impact is incremental, irregular, and uneven.15Olsen 
                                                 
12
 Johan Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanization,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 40 (2002): 921-952. 
 
13 Jeffrey Anderson, “Europeanization and the Transformation of the Democratic Polity, 
1945-2000,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2002): 793-822. 
 
14 Olsen, 921. 
 
15 Kevin Featherstone, “Introduction: In the Name of Europe,” in The Politics of 
Europeanization, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 3-26. 
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demonstrates the five possible uses of the term “Europeanization.” First of all, 
“Europeanization” refers to the territorial reach of a system of governance. European 
transformation is not seen as limited to the EU and its member states. This usage 
emphasizes that an adequate understanding of the ongoing transformations requires 
attention to non-Member states. Second, “Europeanization” is seen as centre-building 
with a collective action capacity, providing some degree of coordination and 
coherence.16 It is defined as the institutionalization at the European level of a distinct 
system of governance with common institutions and the authority to make, implement 
and enforce binding European-wide policies. Risse defines “Europeanization” as: 
 
“…the emergence and development at the European 
level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, 
legal, and social institutions associated with the problem solving 
that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy 
networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European 
rules.”17 
 
In the third conception, “Europeanization” refers to the central penetration of 
national systems of governance. It implies adapting national and sub-national systems 
of governance to a European political centre and European-wide norms.18 It focuses on 
change in core domestic institutions of governance as a consequence of the 
development of European-level institutions, identities, and policies. Moreover, 
“Europeanization” is defined as exporting forms of political organization and 
governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory. 
Although the spread of European models has sometimes taken the form of 
colonialization, coercion, and imposition, diffusion has taken the form of imitation and 
voluntaristic borrowing from a successful civilization. The receivers have borrowed 
from the European arrangements because of their perceived functionality, utility, and 
legitimacy. Finally, “Europeanization” is regarded as a political unification project. It 
                                                 
16 Olsen, 923-929. 
 
17 James Caporaso, Maria Green Cowles, and Thomas Risse, “Europeanization and 
Domestic Change,” in Europeanization and Domestic Change: Transforming Europe, 
eds. James Caporaso, Maria Green Cowles, and Thomas Risse (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2001), 1-20. 
 
18 Olsen, 932. 
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tries to understand the degree to which Europe is becoming a more unified political 
entity in terms of its territorial space, centre-building capacity, domestic adoption, and 
how Europe influence and is influenced. It attempts to understand the development of a 
European sphere that contributes to common conceptions of legitimate political 
organization and a shared feeling of belonging, removal of internal borders, and a clear 
discrimination between members and non-members.19 
In all different approaches to the term “Europeanization,” the common point is 
the emphasis on ‘transformation.’ Transformation can be an outcome of problem-
solving and calculating expected consequences, or of conflict resolution and 
confrontations. On the other hand, it can be produced through experiential learning or 
competitive selection, contact and diffusion, or turnover and regeneration. There are 
two key dimensions of transformation. The first is the change in political organization. 
This change refers to the development of an organizational and financial capacity for 
common action and governance through processes of reorganization and redirection of 
resources. The second deals with the change in structures of meaning and people’s 
minds. It focuses on the development and redefinition of political ideas, common 
visions and purposes, and casual beliefs. Actors appeal to a shared collective identity 
and its implications. They evoke common standards of truth and moral.20  
The transformation resulting from compliance with EU rules has become firmly 
embedded in the ‘great debate’ between rationalist and constructivist institutionalism. 
Whereas rationalists explain it in terms of positive and negative incentives, which 
constrain or empower states and domestic actors by allocating differential costs to 
alternative courses of action, constructivist institutionalists put an emphasis on the 
process of international socialization, through which domestic actors change their 
identities and preferences as a result of imitation or argumentative persuasion. Based on 
different institutional theories, scholars have developed alternative arguments in order 
to understand the rule compliance.21 It is within this larger debate between rational and 
sociological institutionalism that the concept of “Europeanization” plays a key role. 
                                                 
19 Ibid, 938 & 940. 
 
20 Ibid, 924 & 926-927. 
 
21 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 5-6. 
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This thesis bases its main arguments on the definition of “Europeanization” offered by 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier.  
“Europeanization” is defined by the Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier as a 
process in which states adopt EU rules. “Rule adoption,” which is the 
institutionalization of the EU rules at the domestic level, is the main mechanism of 
Europeanization. In order to achieve successful rule adoption at the domestic level, a 
non-member state should adopt EU rules and also should achieve the implementation 
and enforcement of these rules, rather than simply the legal transposition of the rules. 
Based on the different conceptions of norms, there are different forms of adoption. 
According to the formal conception, adoption consists of the transposition of the EU 
rules into national law and the establishment of formal institutions compatible with the 
EU rules. Based on the behavioral conception, adoption is measured by the extent to 
which states conform to the rules.  On the other hand, discursive conception sees that 
adoption is indicated by the incorporation of a rule as a positive reference into discourse 
among domestic actors. 
The “Europeanization” process can be either EU-led or domestically-led. In the 
EU-driven cases, the EU induces the process of rule adoption. The EU demands that 
new member states comply with the all parts of the acquis communautaire. However, in 
the domestically-driven cases, non-member states take the initiative. The second 
dimension deals with the different logics of action that rule adoption follows: “logic of 
consequences” and “logic of appropriateness” in line with the debates between rational 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. The “logic of consequences” assumes 
that strategic, instrumentally rational actors seek to maximize their own power and 
welfare. Bargaining over conditions and rewards, coercion, and behavioral adaptation 
leads the process of rule adoption. However, according to the “logic of 
appropriateness,” actors are motivated by internalized identities, values, and norms. 
They tend to choose most appropriate or legitimate action among alternatives. The 
legitimacy of rules and the appropriateness of behavior, persuasion, and “complex” 
learning drive the process of rule adoption.22  
This thesis aims to discover EU-driven transformation in the Turkish case. In 
order to become an EU member, Turkey has to make necessary reforms in line with the 
                                                 
22
 Ibid, 8-9. 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
acquis communautaire. In terms of foreign policy, Turkey has to solve her border 
conflicts and has to establish good neighborly relations. By following the rationalist- 
institutionalist logic, this thesis will test the “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy 
towards Cyprus and try to answer the question of the extent to which Turkey has 
succeeded in  transforming its Cyprus policy in light of the demands placed on it for  
EU membership. In this regard, this thesis will explore the impact of “credibility of the 
EU threats and rewards” on transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Cyprus. 
Since the Justice and Development Party came to power after the elections held on 
November 3, 2002, there has been a noticeable change in the traditional Turkish foreign 
policy towards Cyprus– one which has been seen as a radical break. This departure has 
been associated with Turkish accession. Thus, this thesis will analyze how Turkey has 
been able to transform its foreign policy towards Cyprus under the JDP government in 
light of its application for EU membership and to what extent the credibility of the EU 
has played a role in the transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Cyprus. 
 
 
 
1.1. External Incentives Model 
 
 
 
The “external incentives model” follows the “logic of consequences.” According 
to the “external incentives model,” during the bargaining process, actors exchange 
information, threats, and promises regarding their preferences. The end result of this 
bargaining process depends on the relative bargaining power of the actors. The 
bargaining power of actors is determined by the asymmetrical distribution of 
information and the benefits of a specific agreement compared to alternative options. 
Actors that have more and better information are able to manipulate the end result to 
their advantage, and actors that are least in need of a specific agreement are able to 
threaten others with noncooperation and thereby force them to make concessions. Based 
on the external incentives model, the EU sets the adoption of its rules that the non-
member states have to fulfill in order to receive rewards from the EU; assistance and 
institutional ties. If the target government complies with the EU conditionality, the EU 
pays the reward. By offering reward, the EU aims to change the behavior of the target 
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government. However, this use of this strategy alone will do little to change the minds 
of governments.23  
A government adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the 
domestic adoption costs. The cost-benefit balance depends on the determinacy –clarity 
and formality- of conditions, the size and speed at which rewards are obtained, the 
credibility of threats and promises, and the size of adoption costs. If the behavioral 
implications of a rule are clearer and more legalized, its determinacy is higher. 
Determinacy helps the target governments know exactly what they have to do to get the 
rewards. It enhances the credibility of conditionality. The size and speed of the 
conditional rewards determines the measure of the incentive. The promise of 
enlargement is a more powerful incentive than the promise of assistance. The longer 
temporal distance to the payment of rewards reduces the willingness to comply with EU 
rules. Moreover, the credibility depends on the consistency of an organization’s 
allocation of rewards. If the EU offers the rewards to candidates who do not fulfill the 
conditions, it creates a moral hazard problem within the target state that slows down the 
Europeanization process there. In addition, the stronger party of negotiations should 
effectively present its rewards to the target state, and this necessitates useful diffusion of 
information on conditions and rewards between the two sides. Moreover, the size of 
domestic adoption costs and their distribution among domestic actors determines 
whether conditions will be accepted or rejected. In this respect, the effectiveness of 
conditionality depends on the preferences of the government and of other veto players.  
Even if these conditions are conducive to rule adoption, target states may still choose 
the adoption form that minimizes the cost. Usually, discursive adoption is expected as 
the least costly option.24  
The thesis aims to assess whether a change in Turkish foreign policy towards 
Cyprus has occurred since 2002 and if so, whether this change is related to the Turkish 
accession process. In this regard, the “external incentives model” is essential in 
exploring the extent to which Turkey has transformed its Cyprus policy under the JDP 
government within the context of its application for EU membership and to what extent 
the JDP government has developed a “Europeanized” discourse in order to be rewarded 
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with such membership. Moreover, the “external incentives model,” which suggests the 
importance of credibility on the transformation of a candidate country, will contribute to 
analyze the impact of the EU’s credibility on the development of “Europeanized” 
discourse towards Cyprus. 
 
  
 
1.2. Transformative Power of the EU on Foreign Policy 
 
 
 
Discourse adaptation contributes to behavioral adaptation. The thesis aims at 
assessing whether the changes in Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus are real or 
simply rhetorical. Hence, it is essential to discover the extent to which “Europeanized” 
discourse has turned into “Europeanized” policy outcomes and it is significant to 
evaluate power of the EU on transforming the non-member states. In this regard, 
Smith’s analysis is crucial to understanding the degree to which the Justice and 
Development Party government has been successful in transforming “Europeanized” 
discourse into “Europeanized” policy outcomes. According to Smith, there are four 
major indicators that can be used to analyze the domestic adaptation to foreign policy: 
elite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, constitutional change, and increase in 
public support for Europeanization of foreign policy. Elite socialization is necessary in 
order to establish a certain level of trust in the system. Gradual internalization of 
cooperative habits and common views are essential contributors to elite socialization. 
Working groups, joint declarations, joint reporting, staff exchange among foreign 
ministries, and shared embassies are vital in moving from the old nation-state nation-
state sovereignty model towards a collective endeavor. New national officials are also 
necessary to increase the cooperation with the member states. In addition, there needs to 
be an increase in concern among the media and interest groups over political 
cooperation to change the perception of the public opinion.25 
 Not only is it important to understand how European policies and procedures 
are incorporated into the policies of the JDP government towards Cyprus, it is crucial to 
understand the “Europeanization” of discourse developed by the JDP government. 
Therefore, in the last chapter, Smith’s analysis will contribute to understanding the 
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extent to which a “Europeanized” discourse has turned into action. The growing 
importance of European rules and procedures in the JDP’s approach to the Cyprus 
conflict is significant in turning “Europeanized” discourse into “Europeanized” policy 
outcome. However, it is also important to see that even if only rhetoric changes in the 
Cyprus policy have occurred, this is still a major accomplishment as rhetoric change can 
precede and provide a stimulus to policy changes. Thus, it is essential to examine just 
how much Turkish accession contributes to transforming the Cyprus dispute. In this 
respect, Diez’s categorization of the EU’s pathways to transforming the border conflict 
will help to determine the extent to which the EU integration process has had a positive 
impact on the movement of the conflict from a stage of a greater conflict intensity to 
stages of lower intensity as a result of “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy 
towards Cyprus under the JDP government. By analyzing the transformative power of 
the EU, it should not be forgotten that the power of the EU to impact national policy 
areas, such as foreign policy, where the EU directives and regulations are absent, 
depends on the credibility of the EU conditionality. The EU makes the membership 
reward conditional upon the solution of border conflicts and development of good 
neighborly relations. Thus, Turkey has to solve the Cyprus dispute in order to be 
rewarded with EU membership. As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have asserted, “the 
credibility of threats and rewards is a core prerequisite” of any effective transformation 
process, the credibility of the EU influences the transformative power of the EU. In this 
regard, Diez’s categorization of the EU’s pathways to transforming the border conflict 
will help in analyzing to what extent credibility of the EU rewards and threats has 
affected the transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus under the JDP 
government. 
According to Diez, conflicts are discursively constructed. When an actor 
constructs his or her identity or interests that cannot be made compatible with another 
actor’s identity and interests, the existence of a conflict is inevitable. When the actor 
refers to another as an existential threat to the self, the conflict occurs.26 There are four 
stages of conflicts. In the first stage, called conflict episode, conflict is at its weakest. In 
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this stage, although the articulation of an incompatibility occurs as a singular, isolated 
incidence, there is no reference to an existential threat. If the conflict communication 
stays limited to a particular issue, an issue conflict emerges.  At this issue conflict stage, 
the actors do not invoke identities as such as part of the conflict; and issue conflicts do 
not contain securitizing moves. However, where securitizing moves abound and 
conflicting parties articulate explicitly essential threats to “self,” conflicts turn into 
identity conflict. When the conflicting parties widely accept the existential threat posed 
by the other and need to counter this threat with extraordinary measures, the conflict 
enters its final stage of subordination conflict. In the subordination conflicts, conflict 
communication dominates all aspect of societal life.27  
There are four pathways used by the EU to transform conflicts: compulsory 
impact, enabling impact, connective impact, and constructive impact. Compulsory 
impact works through carrots and sticks. Compelling actors change their policies vis-à-
vis the other party toward conciliatory moves rather than deepening securitization. The 
main carrot of the EU is membership. As part of the acquis communautaire, the EU 
insists on the resolution of border disputes and developing good neighborly relations. If 
the conflicting party desires to become an EU member, it needs to change its policies 
towards the other party. This change may simply reflect strategic behavior. It does not 
necessarily imply that it has altered its views of the other party or its beliefs about the 
conflict. However, in the long run, these strategic moves can lead to deeper reforms 
through continuing pressure and socialization.28  
Other EU incentives, such as financial aid and free trade agreements, are 
relatively minor incentives compared to membership. The success of compulsory 
impact of EU integration depends on three factors. The most important is pending 
membership negotiations. The compulsory impact loses its power when a  membership 
offer is not made and once membership has been attained. A second crucial factor is the 
credibility of the membership offer. If the conflicting party considers the membership 
offer as an achievable option, it will engage in desecuritizing moves. Finally, the extent 
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to which domestic actors internalize the legal and normative framework of integration is 
fundamental to the pervasiveness of the compulsory impact.29  
The compulsory impact of the EU is not sufficient to achieve pervasive 
transformation. In order to achieve successful long-term transformation, an enabling 
impact is essential. If specific actors within conflicting parties, such as civil society 
actors, link their political agendas to the EU and justify desecuritizing moves that may 
otherwise have not been considered legitimate, this leads to an enabling impact. An 
enabling impact is necessary to legitimize the desecuritizing moves through reference to 
the acquis communautaire. Legitimacy references should not be limited to a narrow 
political elite. It should reach out to a wider societal base.30 
In order to reach a wider societal base, the connective impact of the EU plays a 
crucial role. The EU’s direct support of contacts between societal actors of the conflict 
parties serves as an essential tool for the successful transformation.31 Through the 
financial support of common activities, contact between conflicting parties can be 
provided. This connective impact does not only contribute to desecuritization but also 
leads to a broader societal effect in the form of social networks across conflicting 
parties and facilitates the identity change as foreseen within the constructive impact. 
The constructive impact aims at changing the underlying identity-scripts of conflicts. 
Thus, it supports a (re-)construction of identities that permanently sustains peaceful 
relations between conflict parties. The EU impact can put in place completely new 
discursive frameworks for creating novel ways of constructing and expressing identities 
within conflict regions. These new identity-scripts foster desecuritization in a virtuous 
circle and may ultimately lead to the eventual resolution of the conflict and the 
disappearance of articulations of the incompatibility of subject positions because the 
Europe has become an integral part of the identity (-ies) in each of the EU’s member 
states. Integration enables actors to pursue policies that intensify conciliatory discourse. 
Rather than choosing securitizing moves, the parties adopt the discourse of European 
solution. Without the constructive impact, desecuritization is often a tactical tool for 
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achieving EU membership.32 However, any long-term transformation of conflicts 
crucially depends on a change in identity constructions in conflict societies that subject 
positions are no longer regarded as incompatible and the relevance of invoking previous 
conflict issues loses attraction.33  
In this regard, Diez’s categorization of the EU’s pathways to transform the 
border conflicts will help to discover whether or not the EU integration process has had 
a positive impact on the movement of the conflict from a stage of a greater conflict 
intensity to stages of lower intensity as a result of “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign 
policy towards Cyprus under the JDP government. Moreover, it will be useful to 
analyze the extent to which credibility of EU rewards and threats has affected the 
transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus under the JDP government. 
In brief, the thesis aims at analyzing how Turkey has succeeded in transforming 
its foreign policy towards Cyprus under the JDP government given its desire to obtain 
EU membership and the extent to which the credibility of the EU has played a key role 
in the transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus. This thesis intends both 
to discover the degree to which foreign policy makers of the JDP government have been 
able to develop a “Europeanized” discourse and to explore whether a “Europeanized” 
discourse has turned into “Europeanized” policy outcomes. In this regard, this thesis 
aims to analyze the impact of the credibility of the EU rewards and threats on the 
transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus both in rhetoric and in action 
under the JDP government through various theoretical approaches. Included among 
these are Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s “external incentives model,” Smith’s 
indicators of domestic adaptation on foreign policy and Diez’s categorization of the 
EU’s pathways to transform border conflicts. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE TURKISH-CYPRUS RELATIONS 
 
 
 
This chapter addresses the historical evolution of Turkish foreign policy towards 
Cyprus. An historical analysis is crucial in order to properly contextualize the issues in 
the Cyprus problem. Cyprus covers a central place in the multidimensional strategic and 
regional balances of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and Southern Europe. 
This is why the Cyprus conflict has been at the top of the foreign policy agendas of the 
governments of Turkey, Greece, the US, and Russia since the 1950s. The strategic 
importance of Cyprus has increased dramatically in the post-Cold War era because of 
the geo-strategic position of the island as the crossroad between Europe and the Middle 
East. The Cyprus issue has become more complex with the European Union’s 
involvement as the EU has emerged as a new actor in the Cyprus. It hopes to gain 
foreign policy success by solving the Cyprus issue through the reward of the EU 
membership. These are the main points that this chapter will analyze in line with the 
principles and major turning points in the Turkish-Cyprus-EU triangle.34
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2.1. Cyprus and its History: An Overview 
 
 
 
Throughout its history, Cyprus had been ruled by different regional powers, 
ranging from the Egyptians to the Hittites and the Assyrians to the Arabs. Initially, 
Cyprus was invaded by the ancient Egyptians in 1450 B.C. and was later conquered by 
the Hittites. In 350 B.C., the island came under Persian rule. Then, the control of the 
island passed to the Phoenicians and the Assyrians.  In 58 B.C., it fell under the rule of 
the Eastern Roman Empire. Although the Arabs were unable to control the whole of the 
island, the Islamic conquest of the island began in 632 A.D. with the Syrian occupation. 
During the Crusades, Cyprus was controlled by the English king, Richard the Lion 
Heart, who subsequently left the island to the Knights Templar and then to Guy de 
Lusignan. Although the family of de Lusignan ruled the island until 1489 and 
propagated Catholicism, both the Genoese and the Mamelukes also had partial control 
over the island.35  
Beginning in 1432, the influence of the Venetians gradually evolved. After the 
island came under the complete control of the Venetian pirates, the Ottoman Empire, 
which was emerging as the leading power in the Mediterranean, was concerned and 
Sultan Selim ІІ believed that the conquest of Cyprus was a necessity and the landing, 
which commenced on 1 July 1570, resulted in the conquest of Cyprus on 1 August 
1571. A turning point for the island arrived in 1878 with the Ottoman Empire losing 
power, and control of Cyprus being assumed by Great Britain. At the outbreak of World 
War І, the island was annexed formally by the United Kingdom in 1914.36  
After Turkey signed the Lausanne Agreement in 1923, Turkey and Greece 
agreed that Cyprus belonged to the United Kingdom.37 However, the situation began to 
change dramatically at the end of the World War II with the demise of British power. In 
1955, a guerilla group, EOKA—the National Organization for Cypriot Fighters— was 
formed by the Greek Cypriots and declared armed struggle against British rule in order 
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to achieve  political union, Enosis, with Greece.38 After a particularly bloody decade 
(the 1950s), the armed struggle in the island was resolved through a series of 
international treaties.  In 1960, the Zurich and London Accords were signed by Turkey, 
Greece, and United Kingdom in order to constitute a Republic on the basis of bi-
national independence, political equality and administrative partnership of the two 
communities. Three Treaties- the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and 
the Treaty of Alliance - were signed by Turkey, Greece, Great Britain, and the Turkish 
and the Greek Cypriots.39 These treaties guaranteed the establishment of a quasi-federal 
Republic of Cyprus, made Turkey, Britain and Greece the guarantors of the “Republic 
of Cyprus,” provided for stationing of troops by Greece and Turkey, and recognized the 
right of military intervention by the guarantors if the status of Cyprus were to  be 
threatened. As a result, the “Republic of Cyprus” was officially declared in 1960.40  
However, these agreements were short lived. The Greek Cypriots found the 
constitutional rights granted to the Turkish Cypriots unacceptable and did not accept 
applying most of the provisions of the Constitution.41 In 1963, Archbishop Makarios, 
political leader of the Greek Cypriots and the President of “Republic of Cyprus,” 
submitted 13 proposals to the Constitutional Court in order to abolish special status of 
the Republic by blocking participation of the Turkish Cypriots at all levels. After the 
Turkish Cypriots opposed such changes, intercommunal conflict broke out. Although 
Turkey tried to protect the Turkish Cypriots on the island, it refrained from using its 
right of intervention granted by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.42   
A major breakthrough came in 1974 when the Greek junta regime attempted to 
annex the island to Greece. Even though the Turkish government tried to find a 
peaceful, diplomatic solution to the violation of the London-Zurich Accords with 
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Britain’s cooperation, after the failure of these efforts, the Turkish government under 
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit invoked its right as guarantor and intervened 
unilaterally.43 As a result, Turkish troops took control of 38% of the island. The Greeks 
in the north fled south and most of the Turks fled north. UN peacekeeping forces have 
since maintained a buffer zone between the two sides.44 The Turkish intervention was 
particularly important as it was based on the nationalist sentiments in Turkey as well as 
the national security interests that would be threatened with the formation of a Greek 
Cyprus. 
After that, a series of never-ending talks and meetings started between the 
Turkish and the Greek authorities under United Nations (UN) supervision. The ultimate 
aim was the establishment of an independent, non-aligned, bicommunal Federal 
Republic in Cyprus. As the talks went on without any major results, and with few hopes 
of reaching a political settlement, the Turkish Cypriots took unilateral action. On 15 
November 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared their independence and assumed the 
name of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).45 Consequently, two “de 
facto” autonomous states - The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and The Greek 
Administration of Southern Cyprus came to exist on the island.46 The United Nations’ 
position towards the declaration of independence was negative and with its Resolution 
541 adopted on 18 November 1983, the UN judged the TRNC “legally invalid” and 
asked for the “withdrawal” of the TRNC, called upon all states not to recognize the 
TRNC, and announced that the Greek Cypriot controlled the “Republic of Cyprus.”47 
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As a result, the government of the Greek Administration, known as “Republic of 
Cyprus,” has continued to exist as the internationally recognized authority.48 In 1985, 
talks between two communities restarted with no substantive results and intercommunal 
talks were halted in 1990 after the Greek Cypriots announced that they did not accept 
the principle of equality between the two communities.49 It seems that a resolution 
under the auspices of the UN that would be equitable to both sides was unlikely in the 
1980s and 1990s.   
 
 
 
2.2. Cyprus’ Road to the European Union 
 
 
 
The Cyprus question began to acquire a new character with the involvement of 
the European Union in the 1990s specifically due to the Greek accession to the EU.  
During this decade, the European Union emerged as a new actor directly involved in the 
Cyprus conflict. The EU aimed at solving the Cyprus dispute through a carrot and stick 
policy. The EU was influential in the Cyprus issue through membership prospects for 
Turkey and Cyprus.50 The Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus, known as 
“Republic of Cyprus,” applied to the EU for full membership on 3 July 1990. Greece 
had been already a full member of the EU since 15 November 1981. Thus, Greece had 
had chance to play a more effective role in the EU’s policies.51 This situation has played 
a key role in the attitude of the EU towards the Cyprus issue. The Greeks and the Greek 
Cypriots perceived that Cyprus’ accession to the EU would be the catalyst for 
unification of the island. This would put pressure on Turkey to make concessions on the 
Cyprus dispute in order to be rewarded with the EU membership.52 The EU expected to 
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unite island through the membership carrot. In 1993, the Commission declared that the 
EU considers Cyprus eligible for membership as soon as the political settlement is 
enhanced on the island.53 However, this does not mean that all the actors in the EU (i.e., 
the member states) had similar positions towards Cyprus.  There were certain member 
states that opposed the accession negotiations to start with Cyprus prior to a settlement 
that would come under the UN umbrella. 
In 1994, when the EU included Cyprus along with Malta in the next 
enlargement, the EU claimed that a political settlement on the island in accordance with 
the UN resolutions was a precondition for Cyprus’ EU membership. This decision was 
also repeated in the subsequent meetings of the EU in Cannes and Madrid in 1995 and 
in Florence in 1996.54 The European Council confirmed the admissibility of the Greek 
Cypriots’ candidacy in March 1995, the year the Custom Union Agreement was signed 
with Turkey. Ankara was willing to sign this agreement, thus the Cyprus issue would be 
a subject of such bargaining. Greece declared that it will use its veto power against the 
Custom Union Agreement between Turkey and the EU. The aim was to use its veto as a 
trump card against Ankara unless an acceptable date was given for the start of 
negotiations for the accession of Cyprus.55 On the other side, the government in Ankara 
presented the Custom Union Agreement to the public as a sign of future EU 
membership.56 In such an environment, the public was deliberately misled and the 
government “turned a blind eye” to the EU decision on admissibility of Cyprus’ 
candidacy in return for the lifting of the Greek veto.57  
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2.2.1. The Luxembourg Summit 
 
 
A turning point arrived when the EU launched its new wave of enlargement in 
1997. The European Commission proposed its Agenda 2000 on 16 July 1997 and the 
European Council adopted the Agenda 2000 in the Luxembourg Summit of December 
1997. Accordingly, the European Council divided the enlargement countries into three 
main categories. The first category countries, including Hungary, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus, were accepted as candidate states, whose 
negotiations would be opened in 1998. However, the second category of countries, 
including Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia, were also accepted as 
candidate countries, but the negotiations would be opened later. On the other hand, 
Turkey was the only country that was not accepted as a candidate country although it 
was seen eligible.58  
In response to the EU’s decision to open accession negotiations with Cyprus, 
Turkey speeded up the unification process with the TRNC. Both in the joint 
declarations and in the decisions of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) and 
the National Security Council (NSC), the main expression was that “Turkey’s 
unification process with the TRNC would evolve proportional to the closeness of the 
EU to the Greek Administration.”59 The Turkish government had also started to accuse 
the EU of taking discriminatory measures. Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, had started to 
advocate that the partial integration of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots is a legitimate 
defense against the discriminatory attitude of the EU.60 This situation has estranged the 
Greek Cypriots from conducting negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots and brought the 
Turkish Cypriots closer to a confederation model than a federative one.61  
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2.2.2. The Helsinki Summit 
 
 
The Helsinki Summit of 1999 became one of the major turning points in Turkey, 
EU and Cyprus relations when the EU granted Turkey candidacy status.62 Like at 
Luxembourg Summit of 1997, the triangular bargaining between Turkey, EU and 
Greece over Cyprus and Turkey’s EU membership took a new turn in Helsinki.63 The 
European Commission on Helsinki Summit in 1999 decided that in order to become an 
EU member, a political solution on the island was not a precondition. The main motive 
for this decision was that Greece might have blocked the accession of Central and 
Eastern European candidates. In 1996, the Greek Foreign Minister declared that Greece 
would veto the next enlargement if Cyprus was not admitted.64 Thus, although Turkey 
was accepted as a candidate country in Helsinki, the conditionality of political 
settlement on the island prior to membership was removed.65  
On 10 December 1999, the European Commission announced that the candidate 
countries had to meet equal conditions during the accession process. They need to share 
common values and interests represented in the EU Agreements and they had to solve 
their border conflicts. In the absence of a resolution between the parties, they needed to 
bring the case to the International Court of Justice. However, for the Cyprus case, the 
European Commission declared that the EU was the main supporter of the UN 
negotiations which had started in New York on 3 December 1999 and the efforts of the 
UN Secretary General. On the other hand, if there would be no solution on the island 
after accession negotiations, the political settlement on the island would not be a pre-
condition for Cyprus.66  
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Since the beginning, the Turkish government was against the membership of 
Cyprus without a political settlement on the island and it has repeatedly claimed that if 
Cyprus became an EU member without a solution on the island first having been made, 
the Turkish side would withdraw from any negotiations and Turkey would prefer to 
unify with the TRNC.67 However, in order to gain candidacy status, Turkey acquiesced 
to a decision that Cyprus could become an EU member without political settlement on 
the island. This is similar to the bargain made in 1995 in order to sign the Custom 
Union Agreement; Turkey had observed the EU’s decision of admissibility of Cyprus’ 
membership passively.68 As a result, the Cyprus issue has become one of the milestones 
of Turkish Foreign Policy, particularly for the Turkey’s relations with the West.69  
 
 
 
2.3. The Road to the Annan Plan: Negotiations between the Turkish Cypriots 
and the Greek Cypriots 
 
 
In the light of changes that the Helsinki decision brought, the United Nations 
decided to renew its actions and begin a new round of negotiations for a political 
settlement in Cyprus. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan invited Rauf Denktaş, the 
Turkish Cypriot leader, and Glafkos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot leader, to New York. 
Negotiations between two sides started in New York on 3 December 1999 under the 
supervision of the UN Secretary General. During 2000, negotiations between Mr. 
Clerides and Mr. Denktaş continued; however, there was no sign of for a change in 
approaches or visions of both leaders.70 The forthcoming presidency elections in 
Northern Cyprus could change the atmosphere in the negotiations. Rauf Denktaş, who 
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had been the President of the TRNC since 1985, and his closest competitor Derviş 
Eroğlu polled 43% and 30%, respectively, in the first round. If voters who chose their 
own candidates in the first round had voted for Mr. Eroğlu, he could have won in the 
second round. However, Mr. Eroğlu made public that he had withdrawn his candidacy. 
Turkey had always wanted to see Mr. Denktaş as President of TRNC. During these 
elections, a cross section of Turkey - the president, the prime minister, ministers of state 
and   media - has continued to support Mr. Denktaş. Mr. Eroğlu could not dare to 
become president without the support of Turkey. As a result, Mr. Denktaş was elected 
as President of the TRNC.71 
The UN’s role has been largely affected by the EU’s involvement.  For example, 
the EU’s Accession Partnership Document adopted on 8 November 2000 called Turkey 
to give ‘intense’ support to political dialogue for the solution of Cyprus dispute in the 
Accession Partnership Document and underlined that Turkey had not taken necessary 
steps for the solution of the dispute since the Helsinki Summit.72 UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan was also unhappy over the deadlock during the negotiations. He submitted 
a plan for the parties on 8 December 2000. However, because of the emphasis on the 
establishment of a “sovereign, unitary, and common state” in the plan, Mr. Denktaş left 
the negotiation table. After he consulted with Lefkoşa and Ankara, he would decide on 
whether he would return to the negotiation table. Ankara was also unsatisfied with both 
the Accession Partnership Document and the Annan Plan. As a result, the National 
Security Council, with the participation of Mr. Denktaş, met on 24 December 2000. The 
Turkish government declared that in order to restart negotiations under the UN, it had to 
be accepted that there were two states, two sovereign nations, and two democracies on 
the island. Prime Minister Ecevit also underlined the support given to Mr. Denktaş. He 
added that if the EU had not given the membership prospect to the Greek Cypriots, it 
would have been possible to come together. However, with EU support, the Greek 
Cypriots would not be willing to agree on a common position.73  
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At the beginning of 2001, international authorities, including the likes of Günter 
Verheugen, who was the Commissioner for Enlargement in the European Commission, 
Alvaro De Soto, who was the UN Secretary General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus, 
Alfred Moses, who was the Special Representative for Cyprus during Clinton era, and 
Vladimir Pringin, who was the Special Representative for Cyprus in Russia, called for 
Mr. Denktaş to return to negotiation table.74 However, negotiations were still 
deadlocked. Mr. Annan invited both leaders to New York on 5 September 2001. 
Although Greek leaders accepted this invitation, Mr. Denktaş refused to go, arguing that 
the political atmosphere was not suitable for starting negotiations.75 In 2000, and 2001, 
the Turkish government’s position and Denktaş’s attitude created the perception that it 
was the Turkish side that was reluctant to arrive at a solution. On 4 September 2001, the 
European Parliament announced that the “Republic of Cyprus” had taken the necessary 
steps to acquire EU membership and that the solution of the Cyprus dispute would not 
be a barrier to its membership.76 On 25 November 2001, the President of the European 
Commission, Romano Prodi, also announced that Cyprus would join the EU and 
underlined that if the parties were successful in reaching a solution that covered any 
arrangement contrary to the acquis communautaire, it would be accepted by the EU.77  
Proximity talks under UN leadership had dominated attempts to find a solution 
in 2001.78 However, Mr. Denktaş called on Mr. Clerides to talk face to face in order to 
find a common solution. Mr. Clerides accepted this offer with the condition of that 
negotiation would be under UN supervision.79 Both leaders decided to start negotiations 
without pre-conditions. Mr. Denktaş did not raise the issues of confederation or 
recognition of the TRNC. Any issue, with the exceptions of political equality and 
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guarantorship of Turkey, could be bargaining matter.80 Thus, a new term started with 
respect to over the Cyprus issue as of 16 January 2002. Leaders began meeting three 
times per week. Ankara and Athens were the main supporters of the negotiation 
process.81 However, after Verheugen announced that the EU expected that negotiations 
would come to end by June, Mr. Denktaş started complaining about time limitations. On 
9 April 2002, there had still been no progress in finding a solution. The EU began to 
blame the Turkish side and made Denktaş responsible for the deadlock. In turn, Ankara 
started accusing the EU of excessive intervention.  As a result, the UN Security Council 
called on parties to sit at the negotiation table and announced that Annan would go to 
island on 14-15 May 2002. This visit prevented the parties from returning home and 
lifted the time limitation. However, despite the initiation of negotiations between two 
parties under UN leadership, on June 2002, MR. Denktaş announced that it was not 
possible to reach a settlement between two parties on basic issues.82  
As a result of these developments, the UN Security Council made the Turkish 
side responsible for the deadlock and invited the leaders to come together at tripartite 
summits every month.83  As a result, the leaders of both parties met on 8-9 October 
2002 and decided that two committees would be established in order to evaluate 
technical issues. However, although Mr. Annan declared that these committees would 
simplify the process to find a solution, Mr. Denktaş announced that the obstacles facing  
the Turkish side were increasing and it was not possible to continue  negotiations if 
Cyprus joined the EU. The Turkish government also supported the position that Mr. 
Denktaş held.84 A breakthrough came when the Justice and Development Party came to 
power on 3 November 2002 – an event that altered the deadlock and modified the 
traditional Turkish national discourse. 
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2.4. The National Discourse in Turkish Foreign Policy towards Cyprus 
 
 
 
The initial glimpse of possible changes in the JDP government came at the 
beginning with the inaugural speeches of the new government. Before the JDP 
government had come to power, nearly all Turkish Foreign Ministers had emphasized 
that “Turkey has a traditional foreign policy which will continue unchanged” in their 
inaugural speeches. They would promise that “the established foreign policy will not 
change.”85 For the Cyprus case, there had always been a general consensus in Turkey 
that it was a matter of “national concern.” The Cyprus case is recognized as a “national 
issue.”86 As Candemir Önhon, Ambassador of Cyprus between 1976 and 1979, stated, 
Turkey has followed a “state policy” towards Cyprus. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Chief of General Staff have played the most significant role in the development 
of this state policy.87 The Turkish military had also become the main supporter of this 
policy.88 As a result, the Cyprus question had become an official ideology. It had turned 
into a ‘national matter’ and most probably into a ‘taboo.’ Although political parties had 
different opinions on most of the issues, all parties, including the True Path Party 
(DYP), the Republican People’s Party (RPP/CHP), the Worker’s Party (ĐP) and the 
Felicity Party (SP) expressed similar ideas regarding the Cyprus issue.89 The first 
divergent voice came from the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association 
(TÜSĐAD) in November 2001. Until that time, the Cyprus question had not been 
discussed in Turkey. Thus, after Tuncay Özilhan, TÜSĐAD President in 2001, said that 
                                                 
85 Cem, 2001, 1-2. 
 
86 Đrfan Kaya Ülger and Ertan Efegil, “Giriş: 1974’ten 2001’e Kıbrıs Sorunu,” in Avrupa 
Birliği Kıskacında Kıbrıs Meselesi (Bugünü ve Yarını), eds. Đrfan Kaya Ülger and Ertan 
Efegil, (Ankara: Ahsen Press, 2002), 1-6. 
 
87 Gül Đnanç, Büyükelçiler Anlatıyor Türk Diplomasisinde Kıbrıs (1970-1991), 
(Đstanbul: Türkiye Đş Bankası; Kültür Yayınları, 2007), 74. 
 
88 Ibid, 15-16. 
89 Christopher Brewin, “Turkish and European Union Interests in a Cyprus Settlement,” 
Journal of Ethnopolitics and Mınority Issues in Europe, 2 (2002): 1-20. 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
“TÜSĐAD does not approve Turkey’s support of the uncompromising attitude of Mr. 
Denktaş,” this rebounded intensely in Turkey.90  
In short, the Cyprus question had been seen as a “national issue” for forty years 
in Turkey. The national interests of the Turkish Republic and the TRNC had been 
overemphasized. The policy makers had developed a discourse in which it was argued 
that ‘it is not possible to compromise our national interests.’91 According to Asaf Đnan, 
Turkey’s Ambassador to Cyprus between 1970 and 1976, the policymakers had 
advocated that Turkey follow a Cyprus policy that was more loyalist and more 
appropriate to its national interests on the basis of the national documents obtained by 
the highest decision-making mechanisms in the TRNC and Turkish Republic.92 As 
Đsmail Cem said, they also argued that “we cannot sacrifice our vital interests for the 
sake of peace and friendship.”93  
Moreover, the discourse of “red lines” was used by almost all governments. 
Tayyibe Gülek, the Minister of State of the previous coalition government of the 
Democratic Left Party, National Action Party and Motherland Party, had laid out 
Turkey’s “red lines” in Cyprus: the existence of “two states” on the island, equal 
existence on the island, sovereignty of the Turkish Cypriots, guarantor rights of Turkey, 
and the existence of Turkish Military Forces on the island.94 Đsmail Cem also clearly 
underlined that  
“There are two separate entities, two peoples in the 
island. And each has her own legitimate rights. A solution can 
be derived from the acceptance that they are politically equal, 
that they have their own sovereignty.”95  
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It had always been advocated that it would not be possible to reach a solution on the 
island “unless the existence of the TRNC is acknowledged; unless the equal existence of 
the Turkish Cypriot State on the island is accepted; unless the right to sovereignty of the 
Turkish Cypriot people is acknowledged; and unless the Greek Cypriot side abandons 
its claim of being the representative of the entire island.”96 
Until 1997, the Turkish side had supported the establishment of a federation on 
the island. The main argument was that a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation needed 
to be established and should be independent and separate.97 However, with the 
developments in 1997 with respect to the EU’s decision to open accession negotiations 
with Cyprus, Turkey began to support the formation of a confederative structure on the 
island.98 The Greek side wants an independent bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, 
which includes single sovereignty, one international personality, and single citizenship. 
On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots have demanded that the Greek Cypriots and 
international community recognize their independent identity as the TRNC within the 
framework of international law. Moreover, the Turkish side wants to achieve a two-state 
confederation. For the Turkish side, political equality of two communities has to be 
enhanced. Turkish policymakers contended that it was not possible to establish a 
“common state” with a “common government. They developed the argument that the 
creation of a superior authority over the two states should not be accepted because this 
type of arrangement would threaten the sovereignty and statehood of the constituent 
states. A confederation would maintain sovereignty and legal personality, enhance equal 
powers and functions, and ensure equal and effective participation.99 Đsmail Cem clearly 
demonstrated Turkey’s support of a confederal solution on the island as follows:  
 
“A mutually acceptable solution in Cyprus can only be 
attained on the basis of reality. For years, the Turkish and Greek 
                                                 
96 Ibid, 71.  
 
97 Đnanç, 83. 
 
98 Güven, 82. 
 
99 Ertan Efegil and Özgen Görgüner, “A Survey on the Public Opinion’s Concerns 
about the proposals of TRNC, South Cyprus, the UN, and the EU,” in Avrupa Birliği 
Kıskacında Kıbrıs Meselesi (Bugünü ve Yarını), eds. Đrfan Kaya Ülger and Ertan Efegil, 
(Ankara: Ahsen Press, 2002), 126-150. 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Cypriots have carried their lives within the frameworks of their 
respective States. These two States, on the basis of sovereign 
equality, can lay the foundations for a final agreement. In this 
context, the proposal advanced by President Denktaş to create a 
Confederation by the two equal and sovereign States is for us as 
realistic and viable option.”100  
 
Turkish policymakers not only support Denktaş’s confederation solution but also 
saw Mr. Denktaş as an important politician who had made impressive contributions to 
the “national issue” of Turkey.101 In the words of Đsmail Cem:  
 
 “We have a great respect for President Denktaş. And he 
is really a politician of very high caliber. And I have told my 
foreign colleagues interested in Cyprus that they should not 
consider Denktaş as an obstacle to a mutual solution. In fact, he 
is the greatest asset for a mutually acceptable solution. And it is 
obvious now that President Denktaş has a positive approach … 
some foreign observers misjudge Denktaş, they consider him as 
an ‘obstacle’ to a mutual solution. On the contrary, he is the best 
interlocutor for a mutually acceptable solution.”102 
 
It is, therefore, expected that the Greek Cyprus’s application for the EU 
membership has also dominated Turkish foreign policy both towards Cyprus and the 
EU. After the EU included Cyprus along with Malta in subsequent enlargement, 
Turkish foreign policymakers started to accuse the EU of approaching the Cyprus 
dispute unfairly and unlawfully. Đnal Batu, Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus between 
1979 and 1984, argued that by accepting the Greek Cyprus as an EU member, the EU 
had changed the all parameters of the Cyprus dispute. This wrong and unfair decision 
was also contrary to all agreements prohibiting the membership of Cyprus in any entity 
in which the guarantor countries were not members.103 Similarly, Đsmail Cem clearly 
identified, in his letter to Mr. Barsony, the Chairman of the Political Committee of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the reasons as to why the decision of 
the EU was regarded as unlawful. He stated that  
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“It is a guarantee provided for the communities and 
contracting parties by the 1960 treaties that constituted the ‘bi-
communal’ Republic of Cyprus. Those treaties make it clear that 
the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to any international 
organization within which both Greece and Turkey are not 
members requires the consent of both communities…It is 
obvious that unless the legal base and the legal consent exist, the 
Republic of Cyprus cannot, legally and ethically, access to 
EU…If an accession to EU overriding the constituent legal basis 
created by the 1960 treaties of the Republic of Cyprus seems to 
be in perspective as a ‘fait accompli’…”104  
 
As a result, Turkish foreign policymakers accused the EU of deepening division 
on the island.105 “The EU’s insistence on opening negotiations with the Greek Cypriot 
Administration for full membership, in total disregard of the international agreements 
on Cyprus, is overshadowing the continuation of the UN sponsored talks between the 
two parties.”106 As the EU has deepened the division on the island not only has the EU 
become part on the problem but it has also intensified the unification process between 
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.107  
 
“As witnessed in the recent face-to-face talks, the pursuit of 
EU membership by the Greek Cypriot side has become the main 
impediment to progress. It renders the negotiating process 
increasingly meaningless and an agreed settlement even more 
elusive. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side firmly believe that 
efforts to carry forward this membership process will cast a dark 
shadow on the talks and can destroy the very foundation of the 
negotiating process.”108 
 
Similar to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ position, the Turkish military also accused 
the EU of deepening division on the island. The decision of the National Security 
Council on 29 May 2001 emphasized that accepting Greek Cyprus, in violation to the 
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1960 Agreements, as an EU member would deepen the division on the island.109 Thus, 
there was a general consensus in Turkey among the state elite in terms of criticizing the 
EU for its accession negotiations with Cyprus. 
One could ask the question of why Turkey was so much opposed to Greek 
Cyprus’ EU accession and the answer might lie in the fact that Cyprus is located in a 
position where it is easier to control many strategic points. It controls the transit routes 
leading to and from Middle Eastern oil supplies. It dominates the axis from the Middle 
East to Africa, from Anatolia to Middle East and to the Suez Canal. It controls sea 
routes passing through the Suez Canal to the Pacific Ocean. It is also a strategic 
platform for direct air power in all directions.110 This is why Turkish governments have 
developed their Cyprus policies on the basis of these security concerns of Turkey.111 
Although EU membership had been one of the main foreign policy concerns of Turkey, 
Turkish governments had recognized the Cyprus issue as a vital interest that could not 
be sacrificed for EU membership. The developments since 1995 have clearly indicated 
that there might be tradeoffs between the Turkish foreign policy goal of EU 
membership and protecting its interests and the Turkish Cypriots’ interests on the 
island.  
As a result, Turkey took a stand towards Cyprus emphasizing that there were 
“two states” on the island and developed this understanding as “state policy.” 
Particularly between 1997 and 2002, Turkey strongly supported the confederative 
structure on the island.112 Turkey advocated the establishment of a “two-state 
confederation” in Cyprus. For the Turkish side, political equality of two communities 
had to be enhanced.113 The existence of “two states” on the island, equal existence on 
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the island, the sovereignty of Turkish Cypriots, guarantor rights of Turkey, and 
existence of Turkish military on the island were sine quo non for Turkey.114  
  
 
2.5. The JDP Government and a New Vision in Cyprus 
 
 
A change in traditional Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus occurred with the 
Justice and Development Party’s coming to power with the 3 November 2002 elections. 
After the JDP government became the ruling party, the JDP Leader Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan announced that they wanted to solve the Cyprus question and they had adopted 
Belgium model in an attempt to solve this dispute.  During the election campaign, it had 
been announced that Turkish Cypriots had the right to determine their own future, 
identity and entity. As in Belgium, “one state with two communities” would be 
beneficial for both sides. This was seen as a ‘radical break’ from Turkey’s traditional 
discourse over Cyprus.115  
 
 
2.5.1. The Annan Plan 
 
 
After the 2002 general elections in Turkey, in the midst of the positive signs of 
change in traditional Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus, UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan submitted a plan to two parties and three guarantor countries, Greece, 
Turkey, and Britain on 11 November 2002 with the intention of seeing whether the plan 
would be accepted as a basis for negotiations or not. According to the Annan calendar, 
the negotiations between parties would start on 18 November 2002 and the plan with its 
appendixes would be signed by 12 December 2002. The final version of the plan would 
be determined by 28 February 2003 and submitted to a referendum by 30 March 2003. 
The aim of this strict calendar was to ensure that a new united state in Cyprus would 
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join the EU and this new Cyprus would be able to sign the Accession Agreement with 
the EU on April 2003.116  
According to the Annan Plan, as co-founders of “Republic of Cyprus” founded 
in 1960, the Turkish and Greek Cypriots would establish a new bi-zonal partnership in 
an independent and united Cyprus. The relationship between the parties would be based 
on political equality rather than one based on definitions of majority and minority. The 
balance between Turkey and Greece would be enhanced and the special friendship ties 
with these countries would be maintained. According to Article 1, the Treaty of 
Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance would continue to 
remain in force, but the necessary arrangements would be made in accordance with the 
new state of affairs. Thus, additional protocols would be signed. The unification of 
island with another entity or any form of partition or secession on the island would be 
prohibited. According to Article 2, the United Cyprus Republic would be an 
independent state in which there would be one common federal state and two 
constituent states; the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State. The status of 
its federal state and its constituent states and the relationship among them would be 
determined according to cantons and federal government modeled on Switzerland. 
Under its own constitution, the basic principles of rule of law, democracy, 
representative republican government, political equality, bi-zonality, and equal status of 
the constituent states would be enhanced. Under its constitutional framework, the 
federal government would exercise its powers in order to ensure that Cyprus would 
speak with one voice internationally. The constituent states would use their own 
authorities freely within the limits of constitution. There would be no hierarchical 
structure between federal and constituent state laws. The Constitution of United Cyprus 
Republic could be amended with majority votes of electorates of each constituent state. 
According to Article 7, there would be a single Cypriot citizenship, and also all Cypriot 
citizens would enjoy internal constituent state citizenship status that would complement 
but would not replace Cypriot citizenship. 117 
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According to Article 5, there would be a bicameral legislature: the Senate and 
the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate with its 48 members would be composed of an 
equal number of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The Chamber of Deputies would 
be composed in proportion to persons holding internal constituent state citizenship 
status of each constituent state. Each constituent state would assign no less than one 
quarter of the seats. Decisions of Parliament would be approved by both Chambers by 
simple majority. One quarter of voting Senators from each constituent state would be 
compulsory. For specified matters, a special majority of two-fifths of sitting Senators 
from each constituent state would be a requirement. The Office of Head of State vested 
in the Presidential Council would exercise the executive power. The Presidential 
Council, comprised six voting members, would be elected on a single list by special 
majority in the Senate and approved by majority in the Chamber of Deputies for a five-
year term. The composition of the Presidential Council would be proportional to the 
number of persons holding the internal constituent state citizenship status of each 
constituent state. However, at least one-third of the voting members of the Council 
would come from each constituent state. The Central Bank of Cyprus, the Office of the 
Attorney-General and the Office of the Auditor-General would be independent. 
According to Article 6, the Supreme Court would be composed of equal numbers of 
Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot judges, plus three foreign judges. It would 
resolve the disputes between the constituent states or between one/both of them and the 
federal government, and resolve the deadlocks within federal institutions on an interim 
basis if this is indispensable to the proper functioning of the federal government.118 
  The Greek and the Turkish contingents would be permitted to be stationed under 
the Treaty of Alliance in the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State. 
However, both the Greek and the Turkish troops would not exceed a four-digit figure 
(9,999). The Greek and the Turkish forces and armaments would be redeployed to 
agreed locations.119 According to Article 8, there would be a UN peacekeeping 
operation in place to monitor and promote the implementation of the Agreement and to 
contribute to the maintenance of a secure environment on the island. The supply of arms 
to Cyprus would be prohibited in a manner that is legally binding on both importers and 
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exporters. Cyprus would be demilitarized, and all Greek Cypriot and the Turkish 
Cypriot forces, including reserve units, would be dissolved, with their arms being 
removed from the island in phases synchronized with the redeployment and adjustment 
of Greek and Turkish forces.120 Cyprus would not make its territory available to 
international military operations without the consent of Greece and Turkey.121 
According to Article 9, areas subject to territorial adjustment, which would be legally 
part of the Greek Cypriot State upon entry into force of this Agreement, would be 
administered during an interim period by the Turkish Cypriot State. Administration 
would be transferred under the supervision of the United Nations to the Greek Cypriot 
State. Special arrangements would be developed in order to safeguard the rights and 
interests of current inhabitants of areas subject to territorial adjustment and to provide 
for orderly relocation. According to Article 10, the claims of persons who were 
dispossessed of their properties prior to this Agreement would be resolved in a 
comprehensive manner in accordance with international law, respect for the individual 
rights of dispossessed owners and current users, and the principle of bi-zonality. 
Dispossessed owners who opt for compensation would receive full compensation for 
their property on the basis of value at the time of dispossession adjusted to reflect 
appreciation of property values in comparable locations.122  
The Annan plan was an ambitious attempt by the UN to provide for a political 
settlement on the island before the Greek Cyprus became an EU member.  Its reception 
by the parties of the conflict was varied.  The first reactions came from the Greek side. 
They argued that there would be much devolution of authority to constituent states. 
Under these circumstances, this plan would offer a confederative structure rather than a 
federal one. The veto power of the Turkish side could not be accepted. Free movement 
of goods and freedom of settlement and circulation should not be restricted. This would 
also be against the EU acquis communautaire. The rights of guarantor countries would 
be opposed to independence of Cyprus. Cyprus should not be outside the European 
Foreign and Security Policy. The Turkish military presence on the island should be 
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minimized.123 The Turkish side also had some reservations. First, the Turkish side 
argued that there should be separate sovereignty for Turkish side. The number of the 
Greeks who would come to the Turkish side would be high, this situation could prevent 
political equality in the long run and many Turks would become emigrants. Despite 
these unfavorable conditions, both Clerides and Denktaş announced that they would 
approach this plan positively. However, objections from the Turkish side began to 
increase within a few days and on 21 November 2002; Mr. Denktaş announced that 
there were issues that needed to be negotiated in order to accept this plan as a basis for 
further negotiations.124  
On 27 November 2002, Mr. Annan asked leaders to make necessary 
amendments by 30 November 2002 and suggested that the amendments be submitted to 
the UN on 5 December 2002.125 On this account, Mr. Annan sent the revised plan to 
parties on 10 December 2002. The amendments made by Annan were not related to the 
core of the plan. They were mainly about numbers – for example, reducing the period of 
return for the Greek immigrants from 20 years to 15 years, and reducing the ratio of 
Greek immigrants from 33% to 28%.126 On 12 December 2002 which was a deadline 
for signing the Annan Plan according to Annan’s calendar, Mr. Clerides and the Greek 
National Council were ready in Copenhagen. However, the TRNC Foreign Minister, 
Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu, was representing the Turkish side. Mr. Denktaş claimed that 
Ertuğruloğlu was there in order to continue to negotiations and to ask for additional 
time rather than to sign the plan. The bargaining among the parties’ representatives, Mr. 
De Soto, Prime Minister of Turkey Abdullah Gül, and the JDP Leader Tayyip Erdoğan 
was continued.127 Mr. Denktaş announced that it would not be possible to reach an 
agreement under time pressure, and he asked for suspending the membership of 
Cyprus.128 
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Simultaneously, on the EU front, the European Council, in the Copenhagen 
Summit of 2002, decided to conclude accession negotiations with Cyprus and accept 
Cyprus as a member on 1 May 2004.129 On 11 December 2002, the EU decided that it 
would decide on Turkey’s candidacy at the end of 2004 and would open accession 
negotiations in 2005 if it was thought that Turkey had been successful in adopting the 
EU rules.130 Following the Copenhagen Summit, the UN continued to consult with the 
two sides with the goal of reaching a settlement prior to Cyprus' signing of the EU 
Accession Treaty on 16 April 2003. Mr. Annan had started to work on revisions.131 On 
the other hand, the presidential election was carried out on the Greek side, with Tassos 
Papadopoulos becoming the fifth president of the Greek Administration in February 
2003.132 
After Mr. Annan completed the second revision on the plan, he submitted it to 
the parties for the third time and invited the two leaders to The Hague on 10 March 
2003. These changes were also mainly about the numbers, but Mr. Annan also asked 
both leaders to put the plan to referendum in their respective communities.133 However, 
Mr. Denktaş rejected putting the Annan Plan to a referendum. He said that the plan was 
unacceptable for the Turkish Cypriots. As a result, the UN continued to make several 
revisions in order to win support of  the plan. However, the Turkish Cypriot side refused 
to conduct further talks. 134 At that time, the political environment in the TRNC had 
started to change. On 14 December 2003, the parliamentary election was carried out in 
the TRNC. The CTP, the Republican Turkish Party, became the first party and the CTP 
Leader Mehmet Ali Talat was charged with establishing the new government.135 In 
February 2004, Mr. Papadopoulos and Mr. Denktaş accepted Annan’s offer to resume 
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negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan and talks between two leaders began on 19 
February 2004 under the supervision of De Soto. Numerous technical communities had 
worked to resolve outstanding issues. However, with the failure of this stage to reach an 
agreement, Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat and Serdar Denktaş attended subsequent 
negotiations. Yet, an agreement could not be reached. On 31 March 2004, Mr. Annan 
submitted to the parties the fifth revision of final UN proposal.136  
The final version of the Annan Plan was improved by taking into consideration 
the sensitivities of both sides. In order to satisfy the reactions of the Turkish side over 
the number of the Greeks who would come to the Turkish side, restrictions on the 
settlement of the Greek Cypriots in the Turkish constituent state were developed. The 
Greek side had argued that these restrictions on free movement of goods and people 
would be against EU laws. In order to reduce the Greek reactions, the article stating “To 
preserve its identity, Cyprus may adopt specified non-discriminatory safeguard 
measures in conformity with the acquis communautaire in respect of immigration of 
Greek and Turkish nationals” was included. Moreover, in order to create a balance over 
the demands of both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots on military presence of Turkish 
Military Forces on the island, Mr. Annan made the necessary arrangements that would 
permit Greek and Turkish contingents to be stationed in the Greek Cypriot State and the 
Turkish Cypriot State respectively. According to the Annan Plan, there would be 
limitations on the numbers of soldiers on the island and the numbers of soldiers would 
be reduced over time. The federal government and the constituent states would 
cooperate with the UN operations.137 
Although Mr. Talat supported the plan, Mr. Denktaş immediately rejected it, to 
be followed by Mr. Papadopoulos’ rejection a week later. However, due to the pressures 
coming from homelands and international community, the leaders had to hold a 
referendum on the plan. In this referendum, which was held on 24 April 2004, the two 
communities on the island were asked to either accept or reject the Annan Plan. The 
Greek Cypriot Community rejected the plan by 75.83% whereas 64.9% of the Turkish 
Cypriot Community accepted the plan. The implementation of the plan was dependent 
on its approval by both communities. Thus, with the rejection of the Greek Cypriot 
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Community, the Annan Plan became null and void and initial  reactions began to 
appear138 Annan argued that “a unique and historic chance to resolve the Cyprus 
problem has been missed.”139 Verheugen also announced that “I feel cheated by the 
Greek Cypriot government… There is a shadow now over the accession of Cyprus. 
What we will seriously consider now is finding a way to end the economic isolation of 
the Turkish Cypriots.”140  
The Greek Cypriot community perceived the Annan Plan as unbalanced and 
excessively pro-Turkish. The main reason for the rejection of the Annan Plan was that 
the Greek Cypriots argued that the plan endorsed a confederal state with a weak central 
state and considerably autonomous constitute states. There would be no hierarchy of 
laws. The Plan did not respond to the Greek demands regarding the relationship of 
majority and minority between two communities. Although Greeks represented 77% 
and Turks 18% of the island, the representation of two communities in the Senate would 
be equal. Annan Plan did not deal much with the question of demilitarization of 
northern part of Cyprus. Cyprus would be excluded from the European Foreign and 
Defense Policy. The Annan Plan damaged the property rights of the Greek Cypriots and 
other legal owners of property in the occupied area. The restrictions on the Greek 
Cypriots’ return to their homes and properties deviated from the EU practices of free 
movement of goods and people. Moreover, those Greek Cypriots who would return to 
their homes would be under Turkish Cypriot Administration, so they would have no 
local civil rights because the political representatives of the Turkish Administration 
would be elected by the Turkish Cypriots.141 This was more or less the summary of the 
Greek Cypriot position. 
The Turkish Cypriots also found the Annan Plan excessively pro-Greek. 
However, many Turkish Cypriots accepted plan in order to end their prolonged 
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international isolation and exclusion.142   Although Mr. Denktaş was against the Annan 
Plan, Mr. Talat and Mr. Erdoğan were in favor of accepting it. An important 
consideration for the Erdoğan government was that the resolution of the Cyprus 
problem and the reunification of the island would be a significant step leading to 
Turkey’s EU membership. Thus, Turkey’s support of the Annan Plan contributed to the 
acceptance of the plan on the Turkish Cypriot side. The Turkish Cypriots would also 
benefit from considerable constitutional power, which was disproportionate to their 
numbers in the population. The right of return of the Greek Cypriots to their homes 
would be restricted in order to eliminate the possibility of the Turkish Cypriots 
becoming a minority on the Turkish side. The guarantor states would continue to retain 
their power on the island.143 Despite the positive impact of the Annan plan, its rejection 
was unlucky and ended the involvement of the UN for the time being. 
 
 
 
2.5.2. Recent developments 
 
 
Right after the referendum, in response to the Greek Cypriots’ rejection of the 
UN plan, the Turkish Cypriots emerged in the international community as the wronged 
party.  That is because the Greek Cypriots would accede to the EU as full members on 
May 1st 2004. In order to decrease the Turkish Cypriots’ isolation and to reward them 
for their approval of the UN plan, the EU decided to take some measures.  The EU 
announced that direct trade between the Turkish Cypriots and the EU countries would 
start and the EU would provide economic assistance totaling 259 million Euros to the 
Turkish Cypriots on 26 April 2004.144 Moreover, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
recommended lifting the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. However, despite these early 
positive responses, in the UN, Kofi Annan’s recommendatory letter to lift the isolation 
over the Turkish Cypriots was rejected by the UN Security Council due to the Russian 
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veto.145 Moreover, according to the EU acquis, the Council of European Union has to be 
in unanimous agreement when taking decisions on some issues, such as common 
foreign and security policy, asylum, and taxation. Any disagreement, even by one single 
country, will block the decision. Thus, the Greek Cypriots blocked the enactment of the 
EU’s April 26 decision and direct trade between the Turkish Cypriots and the EU is still 
dormant and the economic aid given to the Turkish Cypriots has been lowered to 130 
million Euros.146  
On the other hand, according to the unanimity principle, the Greek Cypriots 
have the veto power against Turkey’s accession. In this environment, the bargaining 
power of the JDP government was weak against the Greek Cypriots. Thus, on 17 
December 2004, although the EU had decided to open accession negotiations with 
Turkey on 3 October 2005, it is also underlined that in order to start negotiations then, 
Turkey should sign the Customs Union Additional Protocol that expands the Customs 
Union to ten new member states, including the Greek Cypriots, who were referred to as 
the “Republic of Cyprus” on the Protocol.147 Due to Greek pressure, this has made the 
Turkey-EU relations more complicated. In particular, after the EU failed to keep its 
promises to lift economic restrictions of the Turkish Cypriots, the JDP government 
faced intense opposition from the nationalist camp. The JDP government has been 
accused of making concessions with respect to the national interests of Turkey in 
Cyprus in exchange for EU membership.  
At that time, inside Turkish Cyprus a major breakthrough came with Denktaş’s 
decision to leave active politics after he sparred with the JDP government.148 Mehmet 
Ali Talat won the presidential elections with 55.6% of the vote on 17 April 2005.149 
After Mr. Talat became the president, he announced that the nationalistic policies would 
no longer be promoted.  The new policy envisaged two communities living in a United 
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Cyprus.150 This change in the political environment in the TRNC enabled the JDP 
government to make necessary changes in Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus.151 As 
a result, Turkey was able to sign the Additional Protocol on 29 July 2005. However, in 
order to take into account national sensitivities, the JDP government also published a 
declaration emphasizing that this did not mean the recognition of the Greek Cypriots as 
the “Republic of Cyprus,” as appears on the Protocol and Turkey’s current relations 
with the TRNC would  not change. It is also emphasized that Turkey would not open its 
sea and airports to the Greek Cypriots. The term presidency at that time, Britain, and the 
EU Commission announced that to sign the Additional Protocol did not mean that 
Turkey recognized the Greek Cypriots.152 In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
made a press statement emphasizing that the Republic of Cyprus included in the 
Protocol represented only the Greek Administration located south of the Green Line. It 
was also emphasized that the Turkish Grand National Assembly should also ratify both 
the Additional Protocol and the pressed for declaration. However, this has increased the 
debate over whether this would mean the legal recognition of the “Republic of Cyprus” 
or not.153  
Although the EU announced that signing the Additional Protocol would not 
mean the recognition of the “Republic of Cyprus,” the EU published a counter-
declaration on 21 September 2005. The declaration underlined that the recognition of all 
member states is a necessary requirement of the accession process. It also emphasized 
that if the Additional Protocol was not applied completely, the relevant negotiation 
chapters would not be opened and that the Greek Administration had veto power on 
opening and closing chapters.154 In this regard, although the opening of the Turkish sea 
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and air ports to the Greek Cypriots is not a necessary condition for the opening up of 
negotiations, it is a requirement for the continuation of the process.155  
After the EU’s announcement that if Turkey did not implement the Additional 
Protocol, the overall negotiations would be affected and the Greek Administration 
would be able to use its veto power on opening and closing of chapters, a “train crash” 
scenario between Turkey and the EU began to be  discussed. As a result, in November 
2006 during Finland’s EU Presidency, Finland prepared a plan for the solution of the 
Cyprus dispute in order to provide an uninterrupted continuation of the relations 
between Turkey and the EU to prevent a probable “train crash.” Although there is no 
official explanation for the content of the Plan, this plan mainly suggests that the 
Famagusto port and the Maraş region would be given to the EU and UN administrations 
and the sea and air ports of Turkey would be opened up to the Greek Cypriots, 
respectively in an exchange for the start of direct trade between Turkish Cypriots and 
the EU countries for two years and financial aid. 156 This plan was not seen as a 
comprehensive solution on the island, and Mr. Talat, during his negotiations with the 
European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn, Vice-President of the European 
Commission Günter Verheugen, and High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy Javier Solana, announced that transfer of the Maraş region to the UN 
administration would be possible if a comprehensive solution on the island were 
achieved. Talat also added that the isolations over the Turkish side should be lifted 
without any conditions as promised after the Greek rejection of the Annan Plan. On the 
other hand, the Greek Administration announced that it was not possible to lift isolation 
measures taken vis-a-vis Northern Cyprus without gaining any significant privilege.157 
The Turkish side also wanted the opening of Ercan Airport to the international 
flights.158  
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In December 2006, as a result of the non-opening of Turkey’s sea and air ports 
to the Greek Cypriots, the EU Foreign Ministers, consistent with the suggestions of the 
European Commission, decided to suspend the negotiations with Turkey on 8 chapters, 
including such issues as free movement of goods, right of establishment and freedom of 
movement of services, financial services, agriculture and rural development, fisheries, 
transport policy, customs union and external relations. Although it is possible to open 
negotiations on other chapters, it will not be possible to close them either. The decision 
of the EU Foreign Ministers also referred to the counter-declaration of the EU made on 
21 September 2005. It emphasized that the normalization of the relations with the Greek 
side and recognition of the Republic of Cyprus was a significant issue for the 
continuation of the relations between Turkey and the EU.159 Whether Turkey was able 
to fulfill her obligations or not remained to be evaluated in Progress Reports of 2007, 
2008, 2009.160 
 
 
 
2.6. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
After the EU’s decision on both to suspend negotiations on 8 chapters in 2006 
and to make the provisional closure of each chapter dependent on the resolution of the 
Cyprus issue, Turkey-EU relations has entered into new era. The Greek Cypriots as an 
insider started to use the veto card as a bargaining tool during the opening of each 
chapter. This has reduced the bargaining power of the JDP government. As a result, the 
expectations of the JDP government of becoming an EU member have decreased. 
Moreover, the nationalist camp in Turkey has started to accuse the JDP government 
more loudly of making concessions over national security interests of Turkey in Cyprus. 
Nationalists have also started to claim that the EU will never accept Turkey as a 
member state. They have portrayed the EU as an appeaser that wants to gain 
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concessions from Turkey. As a result, the support given EU membership has decreased 
dramatically and the domestic adaptation cost of the EU membership has increased. 
These challenges have also influenced the “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy 
towards Cyprus under the JDP government. 
The thesis aims to assess whether a change in Turkish foreign policy towards 
Cyprus has occurred under the JDP government and if so, whether this change is related 
to the Turkish accession process. In this regard, it is essential to analyze how the JDP 
government has responded to the challenges and how these challenges have affected the 
discourse of the JDP government and its Cyprus policies. Thus, the following chapters 
of the thesis will mainly assess whether a change in Turkish foreign policy towards 
Cyprus has occurred under the JDP government and if so whether this change is related 
to the Turkish accession process. In addition, in the following chapters, the focus is on 
how the JDP government has responded to the challenges and how the challenges have 
affected the “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
A “EUROPEANIZED” DISCOURSE 
 
 
 
This chapter addresses the rhetorical analysis of the main actors who shape and 
determine Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus during the Justice and Development 
Party government. By using the “external incentives model” of Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, this chapter will attempt to determine the transformation of Turkish foreign 
policy towards Cyprus since 2002. What needs to be stressed here in that the external 
incentive for a change in Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus is the motivation of EU 
membership. Rhetorical analysis of the discourse used by the foreign policy makers in 
Turkey does not only help us to determine  whether there has been a “Europeanization” 
of discourse, but also enables us to assess whether policymakers use the “Europeanized” 
discourse in order to be rewarded with  EU membership or not to be penalized by being 
kept outside the EU. In this regard, rhetorical analysis will answer that whether there is 
an equally material need that the EU membership provides which could be thought of as 
a trade off with the security interests in Cyprus. It is also important to assess whether all 
political actors in Turkey perceive and equally value the material benefits EU accession 
would bring. 
Up until 2002, there was a general consensus over the Cyprus issue in Turkey. 
The Cyprus case was recognized as a “national issue.” Turkey followed a “state policy” 
towards Cyprus. Not only Turkish governments but also the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Presidency of Turkish Republic, and Turkish military played the most 
significant role in the development of this state policy.161 State policy implies that the 
Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus was the protection of the existence of the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus until a just and permanent solution on the island 
under the UN leadership was reached.162 This state policy became an official ideology. 
It was not a matter of whether a party was in government or in the opposition camp. As 
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discussed in the previous chapter, almost all parties applied a similar foreign policy 
towards the Cyprus dispute and developed a similar discourse.163 However, the first 
radical break from this traditional discourse came during the campaigns preceding the 3 
November 2002 elections. The leader of the Justice and Development Party, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, announced that “the JDP government adopted the Belgium model in 
order to solve the Cyprus dispute.”164 As a result, since the Justice and Development 
Party was elected to power on 3 November 2002, traditional Turkish foreign policy 
towards Cyprus has started to change. This chapter aims to assess whether a discourse 
change in Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus has occurred since 2002 and, if so, 
whether this change is related to the Turkish accession process.  
In this regard, first of all, this chapter will specify the discourse developed by 
main actors. The primary task of this chapter is to uncover the discourse developed by 
the JDP government and compare it to the discourse developed by the previous coalition 
government of the Democratic Left Party, National Action Party and Motherland Party 
that was in power from 1999 to 2002. This comparison should enable to understand the 
transition from the traditional discourse on Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus to a 
more “Europeanized” discourse under the JDP government. Moreover, the chapter also 
analyzes the political actors in Turkey – for example, the main opposition party - 
Republican People’s Party, the Presidency of Turkish Republic and the Turkish 
Military. Secondly, by using the “external incentives model” of Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, this chapter will analyze whether Turkish government’s position is linked 
to the prospect of Turkey’s EU membership. Moreover, the analysis of the change in 
rhetoric towards Cyprus issue will also determine the impact of the credibility of the 
signals that come from the EU in terms of threats and rewards. Through rhetorical 
analysis, this chapter will also try to analyze the trade off between Turkey’s security 
interests in Cyprus and the material benefit that the EU accession would bring.   
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3.1. Rhetorical Analysis of Main Actors 
 
 
This section analyzes the discourse developed by the JDP government towards 
the Cyprus dispute and compares it to the discourse developed by the previous coalition 
government, the Republican People’s Party, the Presidency of the Turkish Republic, 
and Turkish military. 
 
 
3.1.1. Justice and Development Party government  
 
 
Since the Justice and Development Party became the ruling party in 2002, there 
have been four major changes in traditional foreign policy discourse towards Cyprus. 
First of all, the JDP government has accepted the linkage between Cyprus and EU 
accession. Second, the JDP government has questioned the red lines of traditional 
Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus. Third, it has taken different stance on the Annan 
Plan. Finally, it has abandoned the traditional, unconditional support of Turkish 
governments grant to Mr. Denktaş, the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus. When previous governments came to power, almost all of their Foreign 
Ministers announced that “Turkey has a traditional foreign policy which will continue 
unchanged” and they promised that “Turkey’s established foreign policy will not 
change.”165 On the other hand, the Justice and Development Party government became 
the ruling party through the 3 November 2002 elections and Erdoğan announced that 
“Turkish foreign policy in Cyprus should change.”166 Moreover, Foreign Minister of the 
JDP government at the time, Yaşar Yakış claimed that “it is not possible to make a 
change within the shortest time; however, new government would make new 
arrangements regarding traditional Turkish foreign policy.”167 The first signals of this 
change came through the Cyprus policy of the JDP government. The JDP Leader, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan announced that “they want to solve the Cyprus dispute and they 
adopted Belgium model in order to solve it. The Turkish Cypriots have right to 
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determine their own future, identity and entity. As in Belgium, “one state with two 
communities” will be beneficial for both sides.”168 This was seen as a radical break 
from Turkey’s traditional discourse over Cyprus. Then, the Prime Minister of the JDP 
government at that time, Abdullah Gül stated that “no solution in Cyprus is a solution,” 
and he announced that “there will not be a Minister of State responsible for Cyprus, and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs will enforce the Cyprus policy.”169 This was the first visible 
policy change towards Cyprus. Moreover, the JDP government has announced that it is 
against the continuation of the status quo on the island and promised to work to find an 
acceptable solution within the framework of a just and permanent solution.  
As stated in Chapter 2, until November 2002, Turkish politicians had insisted 
that there were “two states” on the island and developed this understanding as “state 
policy.” Particularly, between 1997 and 2002, Turkey strongly supported the 
confederative structure on the island.170 Turkey supported the establishment of a “two-
state confederation” in Cyprus. For the Turkish side, political equality of two 
communities had to be enhanced. Turkish policymakers advocated that establishing a 
“common state” with a “common government” was not possible. A confederation 
would maintain their sovereignty and legal status, enhance equal powers and functions, 
and ensure equal and effective participation.171  
However, after the JDP government came to power, it started giving the first 
signals of change in traditional state policy towards Cyprus. Erdoğan announced that “it 
is not possible to say that state policies never change.”172 In this regard, the JDP 
government changed the Turkish position towards the Annan Plan, and accepted the 
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document as a starting point for negotiations.173  JDP Leader Erdoğan claimed that “if a 
party retreats from negotiating, this party does not have any argument and does not trust 
its arguments. Turkish Cypriots also need to sit at the negotiating table in order to find a 
compromise.”174 
Second, the JDP government did not insist on the discourse of “red lines” for the 
solution on the island. The red lines for the Turkish government were equal existence of 
“two states” on the island, sovereignty of the Turkish Cypriots, guarantor rights of 
Turkey, and existence of the Turkish Military Forces on the island. Cyprus was 
recognized as a “national issue” by previous governments. It was not acceptable to 
make a concession for a solution that jeopardized security, sovereignty and prosperity of 
the Turkish Cypriots, national interests of Turkey, and the balance between Turkey and 
Greece.175 This position is reflected in the Foreign Minister of the previous coalition 
government, Şükrü Sina Gürel’s position that “it is not possible to accept any 
negotiation over the issues about territory and emigration on the basis of Annan 
Plan.”176 On the other hand, Erdoğan announced that “the JDP government develops its 
Cyprus policy on the basis of “solve and make it liveable” principle. It is against the 
policies on the basis of that “no solution is a solution.”177 He insisted that “the JDP 
government was “against the status quo” on the island.”178  
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Third, policy makers of the JDP government for the first time acknowledged the 
linkage between the Cyprus issue and the Turkish accession.179 Until that time, foreign 
policymakers of Turkey had argued that there was no link between obtaining a 
negotiation date and solving the Cyprus dispute. On the other hand, Gül clearly stated 
that “if the EU gives a negotiation date for Turkey, solution on the island will be 
quicker.”180 He claimed that “if there is no solution on the island, Turkey will face more 
challenging alternatives. The relations between Turkey and the EU will deteriorate.”181 
The acceptance of this direct linkage between Turkey-EU relations and solution of the 
Cyprus dispute has dramatically changed the traditional foreign policy discourse of 
Turkey towards Cyprus. Thus, unlike previous governments, the JDP government has 
developed its Cyprus policy in order to overcome the challenges it faces with respect to 
EU membership rather than overemphasizing the national security interests of Turkey in 
Cyprus. 
This fresh approach of the Turkish government to the Cyprus issue became 
obvious after the collapse of traditional Turkish foreign policy that envisaged 
integration of northern Cyprus and Turkey if the relations between the Greek Cypriots 
and the EU went further. Baki Đlkin, Assistant Adviser of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
during the JDP government, announced that “Turkey has gone to a historical change in 
its Cyprus policy and has left the policy of integration between Turkey and the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus.”182 Then, Gül claimed that “if there is no solution by May 
1, 2004; there will be no policy that envisages the integration of northern Cyprus and 
Turkey.”183 Furthermore, although previous Turkish foreign policy makers accused the 
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EU of deepening the division on the island, the JDP government primarily accused 
previous governments of not preventing the EU membership of the Greek Cypriots.184  
According to JDP officials, previous governments had allowed the Greek side to 
become an EU member before Turkey.185 The JDP government argued that the linkage 
between Turkey-EU relations and Cyprus issue was established due to the mistakes of 
the previous governments. 
Fourth, the JDP government changed the traditional support given to the former 
President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Rauf Denktaş. The Foreign 
Minister of the previous coalition government, Đsmail Cem, stated that “Denktaş is the 
best interlocutor for a mutually acceptable solution.”186 In contrast, Mr. Erdoğan stated 
that “Mr. Denktaş does not sit on the negotiation table in order to reach a solution.187 He 
also claimed that “Mr. Denktaş should follow the roadmap that the JDP government has 
developed. Otherwise, the TRNC will defray the cost of his uncompromising 
approach.”188 This change in the Turkish government’s support became obvious when 
the JDP government supported Mehmet Ali Talat for the parliamentary elections in the 
TRNC on 14 December 2003.189  
In brief, material interests that the EU membership provides, as opposed to 
security interests of Turkey in Cyprus, have dominated the Cyprus policy of the JDP 
government. In this regard, discourse analysis of other actors who are essential to 
determining the Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus: main opposition party- the 
Republican People’s Party, the Presidency of Turkish Republic and Turkish military, 
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will be beneficial in  understanding the divergence between the discourse developed by 
the JDP government and the discourse of other actors and how they see the tradeoff 
between security interests of Turkey in Cyprus and material interest that the EU 
membership provides when they are developing their Cyprus policies. 
 
 
 
3.1.2. The Republican People’s Party 
 
 
A change in the Turkish foreign policy discourse becomes obvious when 
analyzing the discourse of the opposition party, Republican People’s Party. Unlike the 
JDP government, security considerations of Turkey in Cyprus have dominated the 
Cyprus policy of the RPP. The RPP continued to support Mr. Denktaş and did not 
accept the Annan Plan as a basis for negotiations. According to Deniz Baykal, the 
leader of the RPP, “the government does not have right to say “there is policy change” 
individually.”190 However, Baykal agreed with Mr. Erdoğan and claimed that “there 
should be “one state with two communities” in Cyprus and an agreement should be 
based on “one workable state... the RPP is also against the division of Cyprus.”191 Yet, 
for the RPP, there was a significant opposition to the Annan Plan. 192 Unlike the JDP 
government, for the RPP, security considerations of Turkey in Cyprus are essential. 
According to Baykal, “the Annan Plan not only jeopardizes the future of the Turkish 
Cypriots but also jeopardizes the position of the Turkey in the East Mediterranean.”193 
“It covers many points that will risk the security considerations of Turkey. The 
acceptance of the Annan Plan as a basis for negotiations is a total deviation from 
                                                 
190 Şaban Sevinç, “KKTC’yi tanıyın,” Hürriyet, 11 January 2003, via Hürriyet, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr 
 
191 Hürriyet, “Baykal, Kıbrıs’ta ‘tek devlet’ istedi,” 30 April 2003, via Hürriyet, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr 
 
192 Hürriyet, “Kasımpaşalı’ysan bunları yap,” 27 November 2002, via Hürriyet, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr 
 
193 Hürriyet, “Baykal: Annan Planı ciddi sorunlar taşıyor,” 22 April 2004, via Hürriyet, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
traditional Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus.”194 Moreover, RPP Leader claimed 
that “Turkey’s support of TRNC President Denktaş should continue.”195 
In addition, the RPP was critical of the EU’s position towards Cyprus and the 
membership prospect. According to Baykal, “Cyprus’ accession is contrary to EU 
norms and rules, and the Constitutional Treaty of the Cyprus. This is unjust.”196 An 
important point of contention between the JDP and the RPP is over the linkage between 
the Cyprus problem and Turkey’s EU accession. Mr. Baykal did not accept the linkage 
between Turkey’s EU accession and the Cyprus dispute. He underlined that “for 40 
years, Turkey has emphasized that there is no link between Turkey-EU relations and 
Cyprus issue.”197 In brief, for the RPP, the national security interests of Turkey in 
Cyprus are vital and they cannot be sacrificed for the goal of EU membership.  
 
 
3.1.3. The Presidency of Turkish Republic 
 
 
Even though the Presidency is not a decision maker, it lends credibility and 
legitimacy to government’s foreign policy. This is why an analysis of the Presidency’s 
position on Cyprus is important. Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the President from 1999 to 2007, 
mainly chose to remain passive on the Cyprus dispute, but he believed that “a solution 
on the island should be based on “two states” and take into consideration realities on the 
island.”198 The President’s position was reinforced by his staff where the argument was 
that “a solution should protect the “sovereignty and equality” of the Turkish Cypriots 
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and the “balance between motherlands.”199 Mr. Sezer also maintained that “any solution 
on the island should take into consideration “national interests” of Turkey and the 
TRNC and that the national security interests of Turkey in Cyprus should be the main 
determinant of Turkey’s  Cyprus policy”200 Thus, the Presidency’s position was close to 
the RPP in that regard. 
Sezer opposed the Annan Plan to a certain extent and emphasized Turkey’s 
security interests on the island as the key.201 Thus, he emphasized that “in order to 
remain in effect, “deviations and derogations” from the EU acquis in the Annan Plan 
should be the “primary law of the EU.”202 Sezer believed that it was necessary to 
eliminate the risk of losing the advantages gained through derogations as a result of 
application of the Greek Cypriots to the European Court of Justice and European Court 
of Human Rights.203 Although the JDP government was against permanent derogations, 
President Sezer argued that “Turkey needs to take necessary steps in order to make 
derogations permanent and part of the EU acquis.”204 In addition, Sezer rejected any 
link between EU membership of Turkey and Cyprus and European Foreign and Security 
Policy. Rather than seeing solution on the island as a means for EU membership, he 
recognized the Cyprus issue as a vital national security issue.205 Thus, Sezer’s position 
was that Annan Plan was insufficient for reaching a solution, the accession of Cyprus to 
the EU was against international law and there was no connection between Cyprus and 
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Turkey’s EU accession. On these points, Sezer’s position was different from the JDP 
government. 
 
 
3.1.4. Turkish Military 
 
 
The military in Turkey has been an important player in Turkish foreign policy. 
This is, of course, an anomaly compared to European standards. However, the Turkish 
military has played a key role in the development of Turkish foreign policy since the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic. On the other hand, particularly, after the JDP 
government came to power and the acceleration of relations between Turkey and the 
EU, the Turkish military started to assume a more passive role in the establishment of 
both domestic and foreign policies of Turkey. It has taken a more consultative role and 
has not played an active role in the development of Turkish foreign policy towards 
Cyprus under the JDP government.206 
Nonetheless, the Turkish military has continued to express its views and 
emphasized that Turkey should approach the Cyprus dispute by taking into account its 
own national security interests. This position was made public by the Commander for 
Land Forces, Aytaç Yalman. He argued that “the Annan Plan is an artificial solution 
that will destabilize the balance in the East Mediterranean against Turkey, jeopardize 
the security on the island, and make the Turkish Cypriots a minority on the island.”207 
The military’s position on Cyprus has become visible in the National Security Council 
meetings. The National Security Council is an advisory body that the military officials 
and the civilian government use as a forum for discussing policy-making in Turkey. 
According to the military, the support for Mr. Denktaş should continue and Turkey’s 
security interests should be protected.208 The Annan Plan should be the primary law of 
the EU.209 
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When the General Staff assessed the Annan Plan in terms of security concerns, it 
found five drawbacks of the plan. First, the maps put the Turkish Cypriots into 
disadvantageous and insecure position. Second, if the number of Turkish military forces 
remains under 10000 forces, this situation would have formidable security implications. 
Third, the territories which would be transferred to the Greek Cypriots are located in a 
highly strategic position. Morphou (Güzelyurt) is the most significant water source of 
the TRNC. Moreover, a transfer of the Karpaz Peninsula to the Greek Cypriots would 
strategically destabilize both Turkey and TRNC. Forth, the mass immigration from 
south to north would raise social difficulties that could result in social unrest. Finally, 
the guarantor rights of Turkey would be weakened.210 It was highly important for the 
General Staff that after Turkey accedes to the EU, at least two thousand Turkish 
military forces still be deployed on the island.211  
In addition, the most important point of contention between the JDP and the 
Turkish military was that the JDP government has mainly discussed the Cyprus 
question in terms of Turkey-EU relations; however, the Turkish military has linked the 
Cyprus question to security concerns of Turkey. According to General Đlker Başbuğ, 2nd 
Chief of the General Staff, “Cyprus is not only related to the security of Turkey but also 
to Turkey’s rights and interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus should not be seen 
as a handicap respecting Turkey-EU relations.”212 In brief, although the JDP 
government has developed its Cyprus policy in order to overcome the challenges 
against the EU membership, the Turkish military has recognized the Cyprus issue as a 
vital security interest that cannot be sacrificed for EU membership.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
209 Hürriyet, “Kıbrıs’ta sorumluluk hükümette,” 6 April 2004, via Hürriyet, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr 
 
210 Hürriyet, “Simitis: Müzakereler için son fırsat,” 28 November 2002, via Hürriyet, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr 
 
211 Hürriyet, “KKTC’nin kader MGK’sı,” 23 January 2004, via Hürriyet, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr 
 
212 Hürriyet, “Org. Başbuğ: Laiklik demokrasinin itici gücü,” 28 May 2004, via 
Hürriyet, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
3.2. Discourse Analysis through the External Incentives Model 
 
 
 
As explained in Chapter 1, with the “external incentives model,” the EU 
establishes conditions that non-member states have to fulfill in order to receive rewards 
from the EU: assistance and institutional ties. If the target government complies with 
the conditionality the EU imposes, the EU rewards it. By offering a reward, the EU 
aims at changing the behavior of the target government.213 For the Turkish case, the EU 
has offered the “membership” carrot to the JDP government in order to achieve 
transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus. If the JDP government 
succeeds in developing a “Europeanized” discourse and policies over Cyprus that are 
compatible with the EU, the JDP government would be rewarded. In line with the 
model, this section analyzes the major turning points where the EU presented Turkey 
with concrete, tangible incentives. 
When the JDP government came to power on 3 November 2002, Turkey was a 
candidate country and the main goal of the JDP government was to set a date for the 
opening of accession negotiations. The JDP foreign policymakers have accepted the 
linkage between Turkey’s EU accession and the Cyprus issue. Turkey agreed to take 
necessary steps for the solution of the Cyprus dispute in order to be rewarded with 
obtaining a negotiation date from the EU.214 The JDP government claimed that “no 
solution is a solution,” they are “against the status quo,” there should be a “just and 
permanent solution” on the island, and the Annan Plan is “negotiable.”215    
The first major turning point for the JDP government was April 2003, which was 
the date “Republic of Cyprus” would sign the Treaty of Accession. The Annan Plan had 
a strict calendar in order to ensure a reunified Cyprus would join the EU. According to 
calendar determined by Kofi Annan, the last version of the plan would be determined by 
28 February 2003, and a referendum on two sides would be held on 30 March 2003. As 
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a result, a new unified Cyprus would sign the Accession Agreement in April 2003.216 
The former European Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen, called on the 
parties to accept the Annan Plan and argued that if some points of the Annan Plan are 
contrary to EU norms, a certain number of “flexibilities” would be possible.217 He 
argued that Annan Plan was the only way. It was considered to be balanced and the best 
basis for the negotiations.218 He also warned Turkey by arguing that there was a linkage 
between Turkey’s EU membership and the Cyprus issue. He underlined that although 
this was not a precondition for the start of negotiations, if there no solution was 
achieved on the island, the relations between Turkey and the EU would be affected 
negatively. It is not acceptable for a candidate country to not recognize a member state. 
Thus, for the Turkish case, it was not possible to accept Turkey as a candidate country 
because it does not recognize the “Republic of Cyprus,” an EU member country.219 The 
EU emphasized that Turkey has to understand the linkage between Turkey-EU relations 
and solution on the island and offered Turkey the “membership carrot” as an exchange 
for solution on the island.  
As a response, the first signals of more “Europeanized” discourse became 
visible. Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister at that time, claimed that “there will be no 
integration of northern Cyprus and Turkey,”220 and consequently, the JDP policymakers 
tried to signal that the JDP government was against the status quo and the division of 
the island. They preferred to reach a solution on the basis of “one-state with two 
communities” under UN leadership.221 However, time was short and the JDP was a new 
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and inexperienced party. It had not been able to institute its own staff in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The JDP Leader was dealing with the hustings for the elections in Siirt 
to be held on 9 March 2003. Prime Minister Gül spent too much time on the question of 
Iraq and the opening of Đncirlik bases to for the US to be used in its war with Iraq. In 
that respect, the JDP government was not able to haul both Iraq and Cyprus. Hence, the 
Greek Administration signed the Treaty of Accession on 16 April 2003. 
As a result, the EU has started to underline the link between Turkey-EU 
relations and the solution of the Cyprus dispute. According to Günter Verheugen, “the 
EU does not apply a double standard against Turkey. If Turkey fulfills the political 
criteria, the negotiations between Turkey and the EU will be opened.  Cyprus is not a 
pre-condition for the opening of negotiations. However, it will have a great impact on 
the evaluation.”222 What was important was that Turkey would not be able to bring 
about the opening of negotiations without finding a solution to the Cyprus issue.223  
The second turning point came in December 2003. There was a parliamentary 
election on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 14 December 2003. The 
opposition among the Turkish Cypriots under Mehmet Ali Talat found the Annan Plan 
“negotiable” and aimed at reaching a solution by May 1, 2004, when the Treaty of 
Accession signed between the EU and the “Republic of Cyprus” would enter into force. 
Talat emphasized his readiness to negotiate everything within the framework of the 
Annan Plan. 224  Verheugen sided with Talat and explained to the opposition parties the 
support the EU was prepared to provide to reach a solution on the island.225 In line with 
the EU approach, the JDP government has supported Mr. Talat. Erdoğan clearly stated 
“the ones who bring the sensitivities of the “national issue” to the foreground in their 
political discourses and the ones who are the supportive of the status quo should be 
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sidelined from politics.”226As a result, Talat’s party, the Republican Turkish Party 
(CTP) was the leading party in the parliamentary elections and new government was 
established under Talat leadership.227 This was an important step since through a loss of 
Turkish government’s support; Mr. Denktaş finally was challenged on the island by 
other Turkish Cypriots. 
In 2004, the Cyprus issue was acquiring increasing influence in relation to 
Turkey’s accession. The EU decided that it would decide on Turkey’s position at the 
end of 2004 and would open accession negotiation in 2005 if Turkey was successful in 
adopting the EU rules.228 Thus, 2004 was a critical year for Turkish-EU relations. The 
JDP government was determined to obtain a negotiation date December 2004. In 
addition, the Treaty of Accession signed between EU and the “Republic of Cyprus” 
would enter into force on 1 May 2004. The EU policymakers had been continuing to 
establish a direct linkage between Turkish membership and solution in the Cyprus. 
Verheugen underlined that “the Cyprus issue is the biggest challenge against the 
Turkey’s EU membership. Although the solution in the Cyprus is not a criterion for 
Turkey in order to start negotiations, if a candidate country does not recognize a 
member state, opening of negotiations would be difficult for this country.”229 Thus, the 
JDP government had to take the steps necessary for resolving the Cyprus problem in 
order to be rewarded with a negotiation date in December 2004.  
The JDP government accelerated its policy in Cyprus. First, the JDP government 
put pressure on President and asked Annan to restart the negotiations on the basis of the 
Annan Plan. Turkey’s initiatives were welcomed by the EU, and the EU called on the 
parties to sit at negotiation table.230 As a result, the leaders of the Greek and the Turkish 
Cypriots, Mr. Papadopoulos and Mr. Denktaş, accepted Annan’s offer to resume 
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negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan and talks between two leaders began on 19 
February 2004 under the supervision of Mr. De Soto.231 The JDP government claimed 
that although Cyprus was not a pre-condition and was not a Copenhagen criterion for 
Turkey’s EU membership, it was a political reality and there was a “de facto” situation 
that needed to be taken into account.232 Although other actors have considered the 
Cyprus issue in terms of the national security interests of Turkey, the JDP government 
has taken the Cyprus dispute into consideration in terms of Turkey-EU relations. Ali 
Babacan, Minister of State, emphasized that “although there is not a direct linkage 
between EU membership of Turkey and solution of the Cyprus dispute, Cyprus is a 
matter of concern in Turkey-EU relations.”233 In this regard, the JDP government has 
developed a discourse over the Annan Plan that is compatible with the EU rhetoric and 
different from the other actors in Turkey. 
The President of European Commission, Romano Prodi emphasized that “the 
European Commission supports the Annan Plan and it is ready to give both spiritual and 
material support.”234 However, other actors in Turkey that are essential to determining 
Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus,  emphasized the negative components of the 
Annan Plan, brought out the national sensitivities and highlighted the national security 
interests of Turkey. On the other hand, the JDP government argued that there are both 
positive and negative measures of the Annan Plan; however, the important point is to 
agree to reaching a “mutually acceptable, just and permanent solution.”235 Similar to the 
EU’s call to parties to sit at negotiation table by taking into account present-day 
dynamics and not bringing up the fears of the past. Erdoğan argued that “Those who did 
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not support the Annan Plan fear change and do not understand that world is changing, 
Europe is changing, and Turkey needs to change.”236  
In addition, during the negotiations of the Annan Plan, the EU called upon 
Turkey to put pressure on the Turkish Cypriots and announced its readiness to offer the 
membership carrot in exchange for supporting a solution on the island.237 As a result of 
these pressures and the hope of being rewarded with membership, Prime Minister 
Erdoğan announced, “It is not possible to go with previous passive policies and 
promised that Turkey would always be a cut above the Greek Cypriots.”238 The JDP 
government seems to have new offers to table and demonstrated its “conciliatory 
gestures” by developing a “constructive” approach towards the UN Secretary General’s 
new offers. As one of the main changes in Turkish attitudes, Turkey under the JDP 
government never wanted to be party who left the negotiation table.239 On the other 
hand, Denktaş found the last version of the Annan Plan unacceptable and not open to 
debate. Thus, he announced that he would not attend the negotiations in Switzerland. 
However, as a result of Turkey’s pressure on not leaving the negotiation table, although 
Denktaş was against continuation of the negotiations, he sent Prime Minister Mehmet 
Ali Talat and Deputy Prime Minister Serdar Denktaş to attend negotiations in 
Switzerland on 24 March 2004.240   
Second, the JDP government had developed a new strategy by which if the two 
sides - the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots – were unable to reach an agreement on 
every issue, then all the parties; including Greece and Turkey, would sit at the 
                                                 
236 Hürriyet, “Erdoğan: Kıbrıs’ta iyi niyetimizi koruyoruz,” 21 April 2004, via Hürriyet, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr. See also, Hürriyet, “Kıbrıs’ın çözülmesini istemeyen 
ülkeler var,” 29 January 2004, via Hürriyet, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr 
 
237 Hürriyet, “Kıbrıs karşılığında AB havucunu gösterecek,” 16 January 2004, via 
Hürriyet, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr 
 
238 Hürriyet, “ABD: Kongragel terör örgütü,” 28 January 2004, via Hürriyet, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr. See also, Hürriyet, “Erdoğan: Yapıcı olmayanlar 
konuşmasın,” 11 February 2004, via Hürriyet, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr 
 
239 Ibid. 
 
240 “Görüşmeci Talat,” 22 March 2004, (January 2008). 
<http://www.kibris.net/basin/yazarlarimiz/serbest/mgunduz/arsiv/2004/mart/22_mart_2
004.htm.> 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
negotiation table and negotiate the security issues. Then, if it was necessary, Annan 
would fill the unaddressed issues. Both the EU and the UN welcomed this offer, and it 
was decided that Greece and Turkey would attend the second part  of the negotiations in 
Switzerland.241  
Third, the JDP government, like the EU and the UN, had supported a 
referendum on the Annan Plan. After the 24 March 2004 negotiations in Switzerland, 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan submitted to the fifth and final version of the Annan 
Plan in order put this plan to referendum.242 Turkey approached the plan positively and 
convinced Mr. Denktaş to put it to referendum. Erdoğan announced “there are also 
negative measures in the Annan Plan. We did not gain everything about primary law. 
However, bi-zonality, political equality, guarantor rights of Turkey, deployment of a 
certain number of Turkish military forces on the island are included in the plan.”243 His 
position was that there should be a “win-win” situation and everybody should gain from 
the Annan Plan.244  
The JDP government always saw the acceptance of the Annan Plan by the 
Turkish Cypriots as a major step that would be rewarded with the membership carrot by 
the EU. Gül and Babacan claimed,  
 
“If the Greek Cypriots join the EU without any solution 
on the island, the bargaining power of the Greek side will be 
strengthened and the Turkey’s possible EU membership will be 
more difficult. Otherwise, if the Turkish Cypriots accept the 
plan, Cyprus will not be a handicap against Turkish side and 
bargaining power of the Turkish side will be higher.”245 
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The JDP government’s constructive attitudes were welcomed by the EU and the 
EU started to modify its discourse. Rather than blaming the Turkish side, Verheugen 
called upon the EU to put pressure on the Greek side and criticized the Greek Cypriots 
for their exploiting the likelihood of their becoming an EU member without a political 
settlement having first been reached on the island.246 He argued that although Mr. 
Papadopoulos was seen to be the main supporter of the Annan Plan, he had begun to 
complain about the main points of the plan, such as bi-zonality and equality and asked 
his community to vote against the plan.247 Thus, Mr. Verheugen criticized the Greek 
side for the absence of political will to reach a solution. On the other hand, he 
appreciated Turkey’s “constructive” attitudes.248 Both Mr. Verheugen and the High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, accused the 
Greek Cypriots of making small calculations. They argued that the reasons behind the 
opposition to Annan Plan on the Greek side were based on economic interests rather 
than on questions of security. They argued that the Greek Cypriots thought that 
Northern Cyprus would be a handicap in developing tourism sector in the south.249 
Moreover, the EU announced that if the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan,   
isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots would be lifted. Both Verheugen and 
European Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, claimed that if the 
Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan and the Greek Cypriots rejected it, the EU would lift 
the isolating measures that had been taken because it would not be possible to punish 
the Turkish Cypriots.250 In addition, Solana claimed “If the Greek Cypriots say ‘no’ 
whereas the Turkish Cypriots say ‘yes,’ nothing will be as it was in the past. The 
relations with northern Cyprus will be different. The EU is ready to help the Turkish 
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Cypriots.”251 In the end, in the referendum held on 24 April 2004, 64.9% of the Turkish 
Cypriot Community accepted the plan whereas the Greek Cypriot Community rejected 
the plan by 75.83% of the vote. The implementation of the plan was dependent on its 
approval by both communities. Thus, after the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek 
Cypriot Community, the Annan Plan became null and void.252  
After these results in the referendum, Turkey, under the JDP government, has 
developed its discourse on the basis that isolation of the Turkish Cypriots should come 
to an end lifted and Cyprus should not continue to be an obstacle in Turkey-EU 
relations. In the evening of 24 April 2004, just after informal results of the referendum 
were announced, Erdoğan asserted, “It is necessary to lift the embargos on the Turkish 
Cypriots, to open airports in TRNC into international flights, and to start direct trade 
between TRNC and the EU.”253 He also added that “there is no reason to show the 
Cyprus dispute as an impediment to Turkey-EU relations.”254 Gül also emphasized that 
“Cyprus will not continue to be obstacle against Turkey-EU relations.”255 Foreign 
policymakers of Turkey have also argued that not only economic embargos but also 
political ones should be lifted. Both Erdoğan and Gül argued that “Turkey will work to 
lift isolation over the Turkish Cypriots and to call parties for the international 
recognition of the Turkish Cypriots.”256 
On the other hand, since the referendum, the EU has developed  quite a different 
discourse than Turkey. Unlike the JDP government, the EU has announced that 
referendum results would make Turkey-EU relations more difficult and it was not 
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possible to recognize the TRNC. However, the EU also announced that the recognition 
of TRNC required a new UN decision and Russia would veto this decision. Thus, it 
would not be possible to recognize the TRNC. 257 However, the EU also promised to 
take the steps necessary to lift the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots.258  
Thanks to the referendum results, on 29 April 2004, the EU passed two 
regulations that allowed 259 million (Euros?) of financial aid to the Turkish Cypriots 
and the free movement of goods and persons between northern and southern part of the 
island and the EU countries under the Green Line Regulation. 259 As stated in Chapter 2, 
this Commission Regulation requires the adoption to be accepted unanimously by the 
Council. Therefore,, since the “Republic of Cyprus” became a EU member on 1 May 
2004, the Green Line Regulation has not turned into reality due to the Greek Cypriots’ 
veto.260 As a result, the JDP policymakers developed their discourse based on the 
position that the EU should implement the Green Line Regulation and give Turkey a 
negotiation date.261 However, in order to be rewarded with a negotiation date, the JDP 
government has abstained from developing discourse that could be recognized as a 
departure from the EU discourse. The JDP government has argued that the EU aims to 
“lift economic embargo” on the Turkish Cypriots rather than calling for recognition of 
the TRNC.262  
Furthermore, Cyprus’ accession complicated Turkey’s accession negotiations. 
The EU emphasized that the Negotiation Framework underscores that negotiations will 
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take place between Turkey and the 25 EU member states. Thus, Turkey has to 
normalize her relations with all EU members, including “Republic of Cyprus” and 
Turkey should fulfill her obligations arising from the Additional Protocol.263 Thus, 
although the opening of Turkish sea and air ports to the Greeks is not a necessary 
condition for the opening up negotiations, it is a requirement for the continuation of the 
process. 264 However, the JDP government has claimed that it is not possible to accept 
opening of ports to Greek Cypriots. The Customs Union does not cover the service 
sector. It is not possible to lift sanctions unilaterally.265 Therefore, this was the first 
signal of departure from the increasingly “Europeanized” discourse of the JDP 
government. 
On 3 October 2005, the EU decided to open negotiations with Turkey. However, 
the EU called upon Turkey to normalize her relations with the Greek Administration.266 
The President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso announced, “The EU 
understands the historical difficulty of the Cyprus issue. However, Turkey has to 
establish relations with all member states, including the Greek Cypriots. Turkey has to 
establish a civilized dialogue with the Greek Cypriots. Turkey has to understand that 
Turkey needs to receive the approval of all member states in order to become a member 
of the EU.”267 Consequently, the JDP government has found itself constrained to change 
its position that Turkey will not open its sea and air ports to the Greek Cypriots and 
began to stress that Turkey is ready to open her ports to Greek Cypriot ships and planes. 
However, Turkey wants the embargoes imposed on the Turkish Cypriots to be lifted 
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once Turkey’s ports are opened to the Greek Cypriots.268 This opening up is one of the 
main radical breaks from traditional Turkish foreign policy discourse towards Cyprus. 
As a result, domestic opposition started to accuse the JDP government of making 
concessions over Cyprus in order to receive EU membership. This means that it became 
necessary for the JDP government to balance domestic opposition and to meet EU 
expectations. In brief, lifting sanctions simultaneously has become the core of the 
discourse developed by the JDP government towards the Cyprus issue after the EU 
opened accession negotiations with Turkey. However, but the EU has failed to keep its 
promises of lifting sanctions on Turkish Cypriots even though it had  emphasized that 
there was no linkage between the opening of Turkey’s sea and air ports to the Greek 
Cypriots’ and the lifting economic sanctions on the Turkish Cypriots.269  
The most important breakthrough over Cyprus came in December 2006 when 
the European Council decided to suspend negotiations with Turkey on 8 chapters.270 As 
a result, the JDP government started to develop a discourse that differed from that used 
by the EU. Gül argued, “a new phase between Turkey and the EU relations has started. 
The opening of Turkish sea ports to the Greek side is related to whether the EU keeps 
its promises. The EU has passed two regulations designed to improve the conditions on 
the Turkish side. However, the EU has not yet implemented these regulations.”271 
Erdoğan lashed out at the EU for not keeping its promises given before 24 April 2004 
and accused the EU of rewarding the Greek Cypriots, who had rejected the Annan 
Plan.272   
After negotiations were suspended, as Gül stated, Turkey-EU relations entered 
into a new phase. Turkey’s EU process began to slow down in 2007. In particular, due 
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to such domestic issues as the presidency, the parliamentary elections of 2007, and the 
headscarf and secularism debates, the JDP government did not pay sufficient attention 
to Turkey-EU relations. Thus, the Cyprus dispute was removed from the agenda. 
However, the JDP government has continued to develop a discourse whereby the 
government will continue to support any attempts within the UN framework to reach a 
solution on the island. On the other hand, the JDP government has continued to blame 
the Greek Administration. Gül claimed that “the Greek side continues to maintain an 
“uncompromising” attitude. In order to gain one-sided concessions, the Greek Cypriots 
try to change the solution arena from the UN to the EU.”273 On the other hand, the EU 
has called for Turkey to open her sea and air ports to Greek ships and airplanes. 
However, Turkey has agreed to this only if sanctions are lifted at the same time..274 
Moreover, Turkey has decided to partially suspend its military relations with the EU. 
Although there has been no official announcement of the direct linkage between this 
suspension and the Cyprus dispute, Turkey has made this decision for political reasons. 
Not signing security agreements with the EU despite international agreements and 
previous commitments of the EU prevents Turkey from taking an active role in the 
decision-making process of the operation order. On the other hand, the Greek side is 
one of the active participants of this process and it is able to see any secret documents 
which are not available to Turkey.275  
In 2008, the stark silence of the previous year has remained. The JDP 
government has developed a discourse of based on Turkey’s readiness to make an 
“active contribution” to the attempts made by the UN to reach a “just and 
comprehensive solution” on the island.276 However, the JDP government has announced 
that Turkey will not allow the EU to use NATO’s facilities if the Greek Cypriots 
become part of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Kosovo even though Turkey allowed the 
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EU Peacekeeping Forces in which the Greek Administration was a party to use NATO 
facilities in Afghanistan in 2007. Hence, the weakening of the credibility of the EU 
slowed down the “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus despite 
the initial pro-activism of the JDP government. 
In brief, as the “external incentives model” of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
suggests, the thesis argues that the JDP government has chosen to adopt a more 
“Europeanized” discourse towards Cyprus when the EU has shown a carrot, such as 
providing a negotiation date or starting accession negotiations, or when the EU has 
showed a stick, such as suspending negotiations on 8 chapters. Each time the EU has 
shown a carrot or a stick, the JDP government has developed a more “Europeanized” 
discourse in order to be rewarded by EU membership or not to be penalized by being 
kept outside the EU. Moreover, Retired Ambassador Yalım Eralp argues that the JDP 
has developed a “Europeanized” discourse on Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus in 
order to get the support of the EU, US, Turkish intellectuals and the Turkish media in 
order to eradicate prejudices vis-à-vis the JDP government. In this respect, it is possible 
to conclude that the “Europeanization” process in Turkey is not only a top-down 
process driven by the EU membership prospect. Domestic issues are also essential in 
order to affect “Europeanization” in Turkey. This is why there has been a considerable 
decline in the commitment of the JDP government towards Europeanization process of 
Turkey, which had previously been used as a support base for the JDP politicians in 
terms of providing their commitment to a secular regime in Turkey and its 
“Europeanized” vision, after the JDP strengthened its political ground by gaining the 47 
percent of the votes in 2007 elections.  
In that regard, it is also essential to understand the reversal of the 
“Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus. According to the 
“external incentives model,” a government adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU 
rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs. The cost-benefit balance depends on the 
determinacy –clarity and formality- of conditions, the size and speed of rewards, the 
credibility of threats and promises, and the size of adoption costs. If the behavioral 
implications of a rule are clearer and more legalized, its determinacy is higher. 
Determinacy helps the target governments know exactly what they have to do to get the 
rewards. It enhances the credibility of conditionality. The size and speed at which 
conditional rewards are delivered determines the strength of the incentive. The promise 
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of enlargement is a more powerful incentive than the promise of assistance. The longer 
temporal distance to the payment of rewards reduces the willingness to comply with the 
EU rules. Complementing a meaningful timeframe, credibility depends on the 
consistency of an organization’s allocation of rewards. If the EU offers rewards without 
the conditions having been fulfilled, it creates a moral hazard problem within the target 
state that slows down the Europeanization process there. In addition, the stronger party 
of negotiations should effectively present its rewards to the target state, and this 
necessitates useful diffusion of information on conditions and rewards between the two 
sides. Moreover, the size of domestic adoption costs and their distribution among 
domestic actors determine whether they will accept or reject the conditions. In this 
respect, the effectiveness of conditionality depends on the preferences of the 
government and of other veto players.  Even if these conditions are conducive to rule 
adoption, target states may still choose the form of adoption that minimizes cost. 
Usually discursive adoption is expected as the least costly option.277 In this regard, the 
“external incentives model” is essential to analyzing the reversal of “Europeanization” 
process in Turkey towards Cyprus. 
Since the rejection of the Annan Plan, the EU has not kept its promises of lifting 
sanctions on the Turkish Cypriots if they accepted the Annan Plan even if the Greek 
Cypriots rejected it. After the EU failed to keep its promises, criticism of the EU has 
increased dramatically. The credibility of the EU has started to be questioned. Those 
who see the Cyprus policy of the JDP government as contrary to  the parameters of the 
“national issue,” particularly, political actors who see the national security interests of 
Turkey in Cyprus as more important material benefit than the material interests  the EU 
membership provides, have started to accuse the JDP government of making 
concessions regarding  Cyprus. The support for the EU membership in Turkey has also 
declined. Thus, the domestic adaptation cost of the new Cyprus policy has started to 
increase in Turkey. Moreover, the speed at which the reward will come is too slow. The 
earliest possible accession date will be 2014. The decision to suspending negotiations 
on 8 chapters, in particular, has reduced the expectations of becoming a EU member. 
JDP members have started to feel cheated by the EU and have accused the EU of 
applying a double standard towards Turkey and, therefore, has lost its reliability. Chief 
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Negotiator Ali Babacan has argued that the EU is using the Cyprus issue as an excuse to 
stop the negotiation process rather than contributing to the solution of the dispute.278 
Thus, the membership incentive has begun to dissipate. On the other hand, the EU made 
the Greek Cypriots members without political settlement having been reached on the 
island. Thus, this has created a moral hazard problem within Turkey. Turkish 
policymakers have accused the EU of applying a double standard and have questioned 
its reliability. As a result, this has led to a departure from the “Europeanized” discourse 
towards Cyprus and has slowed down the “Europeanization” process in Turkey. 
 
 
3.3. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
This chapter demonstrated that a change in discourse in Turkish foreign policy 
towards Cyprus has occurred since 2002 and assessed whether this change was related 
to the Turkish accession process. In this regard, through discourse analysis, this chapter 
tried to analyze whether Turkish government was involved in Cyprus for the purposes 
of obtaining EU membership or not. The discourse analysis demonstrated that the 
Justice and Development Party has developed a discourse different from the traditional 
discourse on Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus. The JDP government has not only 
developed a different discourse than the previous governments but has also developed a 
discourse distinct from other actors who are essential in determining Turkish Foreign 
Policy towards Cyprus: the main opposition party - the Republican People’s Party; the 
Presidency of Turkish Republic; and the Turkish military. The main difference is over 
the tradeoff between EU membership and the security interests of Turkey in Cyprus. 
Although other actors recognize the Cyprus issue as a vital interest that cannot be 
sacrificed for EU membership, the JDP government has developed its Cyprus policy in 
order to overcome the challenges to EU membership. In this respect, the JDP 
government has developed its discourse regarding Cyprus that is compatible with EU 
rhetoric.  
In this respect, it is essential to discover the extent to which the JDP government 
has developed a “Europeanized” discourse designed to obtain the reward of EU 
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membership or not to be penalized by being kept outside the EU. Moreover, it is 
necessary to analyze the impact of the credibility of the signals that come from the EU 
in terms of threats and rewards. Thus, the “external incentives model” of 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier is useful in demonstrating that this change is directly 
related to the Turkish accession process. The JDP government has developed a more 
“Europeanized” discourse than traditional discourse on Turkish foreign policy towards 
Cyprus because the EU has offered Turkey under the JDP government the “membership 
carrot” as a reward. The aim of the EU has been to change traditional Turkish foreign 
policy towards Cyprus. On the other hand, the JDP government aimed at EU 
membership. Thus, the membership carrot was a big reward for the JDP government 
and the JDP has started to work by changing its discourse. The JDP government has 
chosen to adopt a more “Europeanized” discourse towards Cyprus when the EU has 
shown a carrot, such as providing a negotiation date or starting  accession negotiations, 
or when the EU has shown a stick, such as suspending negotiations on 8 chapters. After 
the EU showed a carrot or a stick, the JDP government has developed a more 
“Europeanized” discourse in order to be rewarded by EU membership or not to be 
punished by being kept outside the EU. However, credibility of the EU has played a 
crucial role in this radical change. After the EU failed to keep its promise of lifting 
sanctions on the Turkish Cypriots if they accepted the Annan Plan even if the Greek 
Cypriots rejected it, credibility of the EU started to be questioned and the support given 
to EU membership began to decline. The JDP government has been accused of making 
concessions over the national security interests of Turkey in Cyprus in order to obtain 
EU membership. As a result, the domestic adaptation cost of new Cyprus policy has 
increased dramatically and has led to the reversal from “Europeanized” discourse 
towards Turkey and slowed down the “Europeanization” process in Turkey. Thus, it is 
also essential to underline that although EU membership has become the main driven 
force behind the “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus, domestic 
issues have also played a key role on the “Europeanization” process of Turkey.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
EUROPEANIZATION OF A FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
 
 
This chapter covers the “Europeanized” policies towards Cyprus developed by 
the Justice and Development Party government and the evaluation of the transformative 
power of the European Union on foreign policy matters. In order to determine whether 
there has been a real change in Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus under the JDP 
government or whether this change is only at the level of rhetoric, this chapter will try 
to analyze the extent to which the “Europeanized” discourse towards Cyprus has turned 
into “Europeanized” policy outcomes under the JDP government. On the other hand, it 
is also important to see that even if there has only been rhetorical change towards 
Cyprus issue, this in itself is also a major accomplishment since rhetorical change could 
precede and motivate policy changes. Thus, it is essential to analyze the transformative 
power of the EU on foreign policy matters. In this regard, the extent to which  Turkish 
accession has contributed to a transformation of the Cyprus dispute and the degree to 
which  credibility of the rewards and threats have affected the transformative power of 
the EU in the Turkish case will be the main focus of discussion. 
 
 
 
4.1. Towards “Europeanized” Policies? 
 
 
 
In the previous chapters, an analysis of the Justice and Development Party 
government’s “Europeanized” discourse towards Cyprus was provided. However, in 
order to achieve a “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus, it is 
essential to “Europeanize” the policies as well and not only the rhetoric. Thus, this 
chapter will focus on the extent to which the “Europeanized” discourse has turned into 
“Europeanized” policy outcomes towards Cyprus under the JDP government. In order to 
analyze the “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus under the JDP 
government, the thesis will use the framework for the domestic adaptation on the 
foreign policy developed by Michael Smith. Elite socialization, bureaucratic 
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reorganization, constitutional change, and increase in public support for 
Europeanization of foreign policy are the four major indicators of such policy change.279 
Based on Smith’s analysis, this chapter will try to discover the extent to which the JDP 
government has developed “Europeanized” policies. 
First, elite socialization refers to the extent of socialization of relevant decision 
makers. Policy makers consult with the EU regarding institutional settings. Thus, elite 
socialization implies development of a certain level of trust among actors, gradual 
internalization of cooperative habits and common views, abandonment of national 
loyalties, and elimination of any conflict between national and European goals.280 In the 
Turkish case, it seems that the JDP government did not develop trust between Turkey, 
the Greek Administration and the EU. In particular, after the failure of the EU to lift 
sanctions on the Turkish Cypriots and the suspension of negotiations on 8 chapters, the 
JDP government accused the EU of not keeping its promises and the Greek 
Administration of using its EU membership for its own national interests. Policy makers 
of the JDP government have claimed that the EU has lost its reliability. Erdoğan 
asserted that “the EU has made a mistake by accepting the Greek Administration as an 
EU member.”281 On the other hand, although the Turkish Cypriots accepted the Annan 
Plan, the EU has not taken any necessary steps towards lifting sanctions on the Turkish 
Cypriots. In this regard, the JDP government has started to accuse the EU of applying a 
double standard to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Egemen Bağış, Advisor of Foreign 
Affairs to the Prime Ministry, argued “Some European countries, such as France and 
Austria, are against Turkish membership and they use the Cyprus problem as an 
excuse.282 Similarly, Ali Babacan, the Chief Negotiator, expressed the view that “The 
EU develops new criterion as an excuse in order to suspend negotiation rather than 
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contributing to the solution (to the problem) on the island.”283 So, elite socialization was 
weak in Turkish and the EU cases. 
Second, bureaucratic adaptation is an important indicator of adaptation of 
“Europeanized” policies. Bureaucratic adaptation requires the establishment of new 
national offices, expansion of new diplomatic services, and restructuring of internal 
administrative structures in order to increase political cooperation.284 When we apply 
this to the Turkish case, we expect to see institutional changes in the Turkish 
bureaucracy. When the JDP government came to power, Gül announced “there will not 
be a Minister of State responsible for Cyprus, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs will 
enforce the Cyprus policy.”285 This was the first signal of a change in Turkish foreign 
policy towards Cyprus. In addition, on 2 December 2003, the JDP government agreed to 
fulfill the obligations of the Loizidou case, a landmark legal case regarding the rights of 
refugees wishing to return to their former homes and properties. 286 The applicant, Mrs. 
Titina Loizidou, who is a Cypriot citizen, grew up in Kyrenia in northern Cyprus, where 
she had certain plots of land. In 1972, she moved to Nicosia. Since 1974, she had been 
prevented from gaining access to her properties in Kyrenia. On 22 July 1989, she filed a 
petition against Turkey to the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of 
Human Rights ruled that she had the right to return her home and she should be allowed 
to return her home and Turkey should pay damages to her.287 Turkey initially ignored 
this ruling. However, in 2003, Turkey paid Mrs. Loizidou the compensation ruled by the 
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European Court of Human Rights.288 This has become one of the major turning points 
from traditional Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus.289 The JDP government has 
become determined to solve the Cyprus dispute. Thus, it has become the main supporter 
of the initiatives of the TRNC government in order to build confidence between the 
Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. As a result, a “Compensation Commission” was 
established in August 2003 in order to allow the Greek Cypriots to apply for 
reimbursement for their real properties in Northern Cyprus. A “Special Information 
Centre” was opened within the Lost Persons Committee on 12 November 2004.in order 
to provide information about both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were lost. Turkey 
gave $150,000 in financial aid to the Lost Persons Committee.290 These were the 
institutional adjustments that are in line with the second dimension of Smith’s 
Europeanization. 
Third, constitutional changes are also necessary in order to develop 
“Europeanized” policies and reinterpret key provisions of the constitutions need to be 
reinterpreted to create a “Europeanized” foreign policy.291 This thesis puts these 
constitutional changes into a broader framework and analyzes new regulations and 
statutes developed to develop the cooperation between the Turkish and the Greek 
Cypriots. Towards the goal of developing good neighborly relations with the Greek 
Cypriots, Turkey passed a new regulation on 23 May 2003 that allowed applying new 
and simplified visa procedures. The JDP government has supported the TRNC 
government in its effort to pass new laws designed to build cooperation between the 
Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. First of all, the Council of Ministers of the TRNC lifted 
the restrictions on exports from northern Cyprus to southern Cyprus. 292 After the Greek 
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Cypriots signed the European Union Accession Treaty, it was decided to open border 
gates on 23 April 2003 to secure humanitarian passes - and to rid the Buffer Zone of 
mines. In this regard, 23 April 2003 represented an historic day in Cyprus.  Greek and 
the Turkish Cypriots had their first chance to visit the other side of the island since 
1974. This was a revolutionary step taken to demonstrate that the easing of restrictions 
would be a test of whether the two sides could live together.293 The TRNC authorities 
lifted the passport obligation on 25 May 2004 and adopted a new regulation allowing 
Greek Cypriots to enter the TRNC with ID cards. Moreover, the TRNC authorities lifted 
all restrictions over both imports and exports between northern and southern Cyprus. On 
23 May 2005, a law regulating the legal status of schools attended by Greek Cypriots 
was passed. School books used by the Greek Cypriots in the TRNC were harmonized 
with EU standards. It also permitted the opening of a secondary school for Greek 
Cypriots who live in Karpaz. On 19 December 2005, the TRNC made amendments in 
the Compensation Commission Regulation in order to allow Greek Cypriots to apply for 
indemnity or exchange of their properties in Northern Cyprus. The visa application for 
the Greek Cypriots and Greek citizens who enter TRNC by air and sea routes was lifted 
on 4 January 2006.294 These changes demonstrate that there were significant 
modifications of Turkey’s policy towards Cyprus. These steps are essential to easing the 
tension and economic imbalance between the two communities; however, there are no 
signs that the key political issues of territory and sovereignty are any closer to being 
resolved.295 
Fourth, increase in public support is essential to contribute to developing 
“Europeanized” policies. Public support for political cooperation with the EU will make 
it easier to make the policy changes necessary to attain European standards and working 
with civil society organizations will have the effect of increasing public support for the 
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development of “Europeanized” policies.296 For the Turkish case, TÜSĐAD became the 
main supporter of the JDP’s policy towards Cyprus and welcomed the JDP’s support of 
the Annan Plan. Like the JDP government, TÜSĐAD announced that the Annan Plan 
was a chance for the people who live on the island and argued that it was necessary to 
transform Turkey’s Cyprus policy so as to achieve EU membership.297 TÜSĐAD 
President Tuncay Özilhan claimed that EU membership should be the main goal, and all 
international affairs, including Cyprus, should be thought of within this framework. 
Turkey needs to find an optimum solution on the island for EU membership.298 In this 
regard, TÜSĐAD’s support has been a source of support for the JDP government in its 
effort to take the steps necessary to develop more “Europeanized” policies towards 
Cyprus; it can be seen, then, that TÜSĐAD and the JDP government spoke with one 
voice. 
On the other hand, decline in public support for the EU membership has led to a 
departure from a “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus. In 2005, 
55% of the public believed that Turkey-EU relations were on the right track. However, 
this proportion had declined to 49% by autumn 2007 and confidence in the EU has 
declined to 25%. The proportion of people who saw EU membership as beneficial for 
Turkey has declined from 53% to 49%.299 These drops in public support demonstrate 
that domestic adaptation cost of developing “Europeanized” Cyprus policies has 
increased dramatically.  
In summary, it seems like the “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy 
towards Cyprus remains highly restrictive and the “Europeanized” Cyprus policies of 
the JDP government have been symbolic. In other words, a “Europeanized” discourse 
has turned into “Europeanized” policies in very limited areas. Most of the 
“Europeanized” policies have been “confidence-building” measures rather than 
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contributions to a “comprehensive” solution. Moreover, as Retired Ambassador Yalım 
Eralp has stated, although these policies are supported by Turkey, they are mainly 
TRNC-driven.300 Turkey has only given support and financial aid to these initiatives. 
Thus, it is possible to conclude that change in Cyprus policy mainly remains at the level 
of rhetoric. However, it should not be forgotten that this is also a major accomplishment 
as rhetorical change may precede and generate policy changes. Hence, it is necessary to 
analyze the transformative power of the EU in foreign policy matters, specifically; the 
extent to which Turkish accession contributes to the transformation of the Cyprus 
dispute and the degree to which of EU credibility plays a role in this transformation. 
 
 
 
4.2. Transformative Power of the EU in the Cyprus Conflict 
 
 
 
Conflict is defined as mutual representations of the parties involved as an 
essential threat to their identity and even existence.301 According to Diez, there are four 
stages of conflict. At the first stage, called as conflict episode, conflict is at its weakest. 
At this stage, although the articulation of an incompatibility occurs as a singular, 
isolated incidence, there is no reference to an existential threat. If the conflict 
communication stays limited to a particular issue, an issue conflict displays. At this 
issue conflict stage, the actors do not invoke identities as such as part of the conflict; 
and issue conflicts do not contain securitizing moves. However, where securitizing 
moves abound and conflicting parties articulate explicitly essential threats to “self,” 
conflicts turn into identity conflict. When the conflicting parties widely accept the 
existential threat posed by the other and need to counter this threat with extraordinary 
measures, the conflict enters its final stage of subordination conflict. In the 
subordination conflicts, conflict communication dominates all aspect of societal life.302  
Although this thesis does not aim at definitively classifying the stage of the 
Cyprus conflict sharply, the thesis argues that the conflict is at the final stage of 
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subordination conflict. The conflicting parties, both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, 
widely accept the existential threat posed by the other and need to counter this threat 
with extraordinary measures. Defense expenditures have dominated the yearly budgets. 
Not only securitizing moves, such as high defense expenditures or laying mines, but 
also extraordinary measures, such as trade restrictions or hostile approach of history 
books, have dominated all aspects of the societal life. However, the JDP government 
has aimed at “Europeanizing” its Cyprus policies, and supports the presidency of 
Mehmet Ali Talat in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.303 As a result, the 
Cyprus dispute has been transformed from a subordination conflict into an identity 
conflict. Although both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots have continued to accept the 
other as an existential threat, securitizing moves have started to lessen. The TRNC has 
started to sweep mines in northern Cyprus. Border gates have started to be opened. All 
trade restrictions have been lifted by the TRNC. History books in the TRNC were 
rewritten in order to comply with EU standards.304 However, these initiatives were 
mainly Turkey and the TRNC-driven. The President of the Greek Cypriots, Tassos 
Papadopoulos, threatened the Greek Cypriots with retribution if they went to northern 
Cyprus, and also vetoed the publication of new books rewritten by Greece.305 On the 
other hand, since the Communist AKEL Party’s Leader Demetris Christofias came to 
power on 24 February 2008, he has become one of the main supporters of solution on 
the island.306 After he came to power, Ledra Street crossing (Lokmacı gate), which had 
remained closed for 45 years, was opened to pedestrian crossings on 3 April 2008.307 
The role of the EU in this transformation from subordination conflict, which is a 
stage of greatest conflict intensity, to identity conflict, which is stage of lower intensity, 
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is essential. There are four pathways that have been taken by the EU to transform 
conflicts: compulsory impact, enabling impact, connective impact, and constructive 
impact. Compulsory impact works through carrots and sticks. It works by compelling 
actors to change their policies vis-à-vis the other party by moving towards conciliatory 
actions rather than deepening securitization. The main carrot of the EU is membership. 
As part of the acquis communautaire, the EU insists on the resolution of border disputes 
and developing good neighborly relations. If the conflicting party desires to become an 
EU member, it needs to change its policies towards the other party. This change may 
simply reflect strategic behavior. It does not necessarily imply that it has altered its 
views of the other party or its beliefs about the conflict. Thus, this policy change can be 
interpreted as a tactical tool to acquire EU membership.308  
For the Turkish case, the thesis argues that the JDP government has chosen to 
adopt a more “Europeanized” Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus when the EU has 
shown a carrot, such as giving a negotiation date or starting accession negotiations or 
when the EU has shown a stick, such as suspending negotiations on 8 chapters. 
However, the Cyprus case has demonstrated that the credibility of the EU has played a 
key role on the “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus. The 
credibility of threats and promises of the EU is a key issue for the EU in its effort to 
enhance its compulsory impact. If the EU offers rewards without fulfilling the 
conditions, it creates a moral hazard problem within the target state, which slows down 
the “Europeanization” process there. 309 Since the rejection of the Annan Plan, the EU 
has not kept its promise that it would lift the sanctions imposed on the Turkish Cypriots 
if the Turkish Cypriots accepted the Annan Plan and the Greek Cypriots rejected it. On 
the other hand, the EU made the Greek Cypriots a full member without political 
settlement on the island having been achieved. Thus, this has created a moral hazard 
problem within Turkey. Furthermore, after the EU failed to keep its promises, criticism 
of the EU has increased dramatically. In addition, particularly after the decision to 
suspend negotiations on 8 chapters, expectations of becoming an EU member have 
decline. The JDP policy makers have started to accuse the EU of applying a double 
standard to Turkey. Thus, the domestic adaptation cost of developing “Europeanized” 
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Cyprus policies has increased. As a result, the membership incentive for the JDP 
government has started to decrease. The European Union started to lose its 
transformative power after the JDP government felt that Turkey was being excluded 
from the EU club and perceived that the membership incentive was an arbitrary 
decision.310 In this regard, the “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy towards 
Cyprus has slowed down. As a result, all of these overshadow the transformative power 
of the EU in Cyprus. 
The second pathway taken by the EU to contribute to the transformation of 
border conflicts is enabling impact. If specific actors within conflicting parties, such as 
civil society actors, link their political agendas to the EU and justify desecuritizing 
moves that may otherwise not have been considered legitimate, this leads to enabling 
impact. Enabling impact is necessary to legitimize the desecuritizing moves through 
reference to the acquis communautaire. Legitimacy references should not be limited to 
narrow political elite. It should reach out to a wider societal base.311 Both in Turkey and 
in the TRNC, civil society organizations have played a key role in convincing 
governments to take the necessary steps to reach a comprehensive solution on the 
island. These civil society organizations have been the main supporters of EU 
membership. They have accepted the link between Turkey-EU relations and the solution 
in the Cyprus dispute and have called on governments to work for solution of Cyprus 
dispute in order to be rewarded with EU membership.312 In this regard, TÜSĐAD has 
played a key role in legitimizing the “Europeanized” Cyprus policies of the JDP 
government and has helped to increase the transformative power of the EU. 
On the other hand, in order to reach a wider societal base, the connective impact 
of the EU plays a crucial role. The EU’s direct support of contacts between societal 
actors of the conflicting parties serves as an essential tool for successful 
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transformation.313 Through the financial support of common activities, the contact 
between conflicting parties can be provided. This connective impact does not only 
contribute to desecuritization but also leads to a broader societal effect in the form of 
social networks across conflicting parties and facilitates  identity change.314 In contrast 
for the Cyprus case, although the EU has supported direct contacts between the Turkish 
and the Greek Cypriots, the EU has failed to lift sanctions imposed on the Turkish 
Cypriots or  to give financial aid to the Turkish Cypriots. As a result, the EU has failed 
to establish direct connection between two sides in Cyprus.315 
Moreover, the constructive impact aims at changing the underlying identity-
scripts of conflicting parties. Thus, it supports a (re-)construction of identities that 
permanently sustains peaceful relations between the conflicting parties. The EU impact 
can put in place completely new discursive frameworks for creating novel ways of 
constructing and expressing identities within conflict regions. These new identity-scripts 
foster desecuritization in a virtuous circle and may ultimately lead to the eventual 
resolution of the conflict and the disappearance of articulations of the incompatibility of 
subject positions because  “Europe” has become an integral part of the identity/-ies in 
each of the EU’s member states. Integration enables actors to pursue policies that 
intensify conciliatory discourse. Rather than choosing securitizing moves, the parties 
adopt the discourse of a “European solution.” Without the constructive impact, 
desecuritization is often a tactical tool for achieving EU membership.316 As the previous 
chapter indicated, like the EU, the discourse of “just and permanent solution under the 
UN umbrella” has been developed. However, a more “Europeanized” discourse has 
been developed in order to be rewarded by EU membership or not to be punished by 
being kept outside the EU. As a result of utility-driven calculations rather than norm-
driven identity-based concerns, a “Europeanized” discourse has been adopted. Thus, the 
EU has failed to achieve a constructive impact in Cyprus. Desecuritization measures 
have been mainly taken as a tactical tool for achieving the EU membership. 
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In brief, it is possible to argue that the EU has been successful in developing 
compulsory and enabling impacts in Cyprus. However, the EU has failed to achieve 
connective and constructive impacts on the island. As a result, although the EU has 
played a key role in the transformation of Cyprus conflict from subordination conflict to 
identity conflict, the EU’s transformative power in Cyprus dispute has become limited. 
The credibility of the EU has played a key role. The EU has failed to keep its promises 
of lifting sanctions imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, and it has offered EU membership 
to the Greek Administration without a political settlement having been reached on the 
island. In this regard, it is possible to conclude that after the failure of the EU to fulfill 
its obligations, the EU’s credibility has been questioned and the “Europeanization” 
process towards Cyprus has slowed down. Hence, the credibility of the EU rewards and 
threats are essential to affecting transformative power on foreign policy matters. 
In this regard, it is possible to argue that the process of accession can be a 
positive instrument for resolving and preventing conflict, as applied to the case of 
Cyprus and Turkey. Although the lack of credibility has negative effects on helping to 
reach a solution on the island, eventual membership for Turkey still provides the 
necessary incentives for a solution to the Cyprus issue. Since the beginning, the EU has 
assumed that the negotiations would have a catalytic effect on the Cyprus conflict and 
help to bring about a solution.317 The EU has hoped to put pressure on Turkey by 
linking the Turkish accession process with progress on the resolution of Cyprus issue, 
even though Turkey was against the establishment of such an explicit link between her 
own accession and the resolution of the Cyprus dispute.318 However, after the JDP 
government came to power, the JDP has made Turkey’s membership a policy priority 
and accepted tying Turkey’s accession to the EU with the solution of the Cyprus 
problem. This membership prospect has provided the necessary incentive for the 
solution to the Cyprus dispute.319 On the other hand, after the Greek Administration 
became an EU member, the Union is not an outside actor. It has become part of the 
conflict. As a result, the EU has been accused of putting Greek interests over Turkish 
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ones.320 Particularly, after the EU failed to support intercommunal grassroots activities 
and carrots, such as lifting economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, offered by the 
EU were not turned into reality, the EU started to lose its credibility in the eyes of 
public.321 Then, since the EU failed to set a precise date for accession, membership 
prospect has declined. 322 In particular, after the discussions over privileged partnership, 
which is not Turkey wants, intensified, the EU has become a less attractive prize to seek 
or attain, and has diminished the EU’s informal power to influence domestic changes in 
Turkey.323 In this regard, the transformative power of the EU on the Cyprus dispute has 
decreased dramatically. In brief, it is possible to argue that although the catalyst effect 
of the EU membership negotiations is not high as expected, the membership prospect 
has created a positive incentive for negotiating a solution to the Cyrus dispute.
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Turkey-EU relations have gained new momentum after Turkey was accepted as 
a candidate country at the Helsinki Summit of 1999. Candidacy status has accelerated 
the political reform process in Turkey. In particular, Turkey has been undergoing 
continual and unprecedented political reform process since 2001. Thus, it is essential to 
discuss the extent to which Turkey has managed to bring about the changes in itself that 
EU membership demands. In this regard, the thesis has explored the EU’s impact on 
transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus. This is particularly important 
as Cyprus and the Turkish involvement in the Cyprus problem has been a crucial factor 
determining Turkey’s relations with the EU as well as its accession negotiations. 
Particularly since the Justice and Development Party came to power on 3 November 
2002, it has made EU membership a policy priority, and Turkey’s accession to the EU is 
ultimately tied to the solution of the Cyprus problem. Thus, the thesis aimed at assessing 
whether a change in Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus has occurred since 2002 
and, if so, whether this change was related to the Turkish accession process. 
The thesis concludes that after the JDP government came to power, traditional 
discourse of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus started to change. The main 
difference between traditional discourse and the discourse developed by the JDP 
government concerns the tradeoff between the EU membership and the security 
interests of Turkey in Cyprus. Although other foreign policy actors, e.g., the main 
opposition party - Republican People’s Party, the President of Turkish Republic, the 
Turkish Military Forces, to the former President of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cypriots, recognize the Cyprus issue as a vital national security interest that cannot be 
sacrificed for EU membership, the JDP government has developed its Cyprus policy in 
order to overcome the challenges against EU membership. In this respect, the JDP 
government has developed its discourse over Cyprus compatible with EU rhetoric. By 
using the “external incentives model” of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, the thesis 
concludes that the external incentive for a change in Turkish foreign policy towards 
Cyprus is the motivation for EU membership and change in rhetoric is directly related to 
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the Turkish accession process. According to “external incentives model,” the EU sets 
the adoption of its rules that the non-member states have to fulfill in order to receive 
rewards from the EU. The thesis demonstrated that, for the Turkish case, the JDP 
government has developed a more “Europeanized” discourse than a traditional one with 
respect to Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus because the EU has offered Turkey 
under the JDP government the “membership carrot” as a reward. The aim of the EU was 
to change traditional Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus. On the other hand, the JDP 
government aimed at Turkey’s EU membership. Thus, membership carrot was a 
substantial reward for the JDP government and as a consequence, the JDP has started to 
work by changing its discourse. The JDP government has chosen to adopt a more 
“Europeanized” discourse towards Cyprus when the EU has showed a carrot – this 
includes, for example, the giving of a negotiation date or the starting of accession 
negotiations. The e EU has also waved its “stick,” as in the case of suspension of 
negotiations on 8 chapters. In either case – carrot or stick - the JDP government has 
developed more “Europeanized” discourse in order to be rewarded by EU membership 
or not to be punished by being kept outside the EU. 
On the other hand, the thesis concludes that “Europeanization” of Turkish 
foreign policy towards Cyprus has remained solely rhetorical. By using Smith’s 
analysis, the thesis concludes that “Europeanized” discourse has turned into 
“Europeanized” policy outcomes in very limited areas. According to Michael Smith, 
there are four major indicators of policy change: elite socialization, bureaucratic 
reorganization, constitutional change, and increase in public support for 
Europeanization of foreign policy. The thesis demonstrated that, for the Turkish case, 
the JDP government has mainly supported the TRNC-driven “Europeanized” policies 
and given financial aid to these TRNC-driven policies. On the other hand, elite 
socialization is weak in Turkey. The JDP government has failed to contribute to the 
development of a certain level of trust between Turkey, the Greek Cypriots, and the EU, 
internalize its cooperative habits and common views, or abandon national loyalties. In 
addition, particularly, after the EU decided to suspend negotiations on 8 chapters, public 
support of EU membership began to decline. As a result, the domestic adaptation cost of 
adopting new Cyprus policies has increased and has made it difficult to develop 
“Europeanized” Cyprus policies. Although some bureaucratic and constitutional 
changes have been made, they are too limited. Most of them have been “confidence-
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building” measures rather than true contributions to reaching a “comprehensive” 
solution. However, the thesis underlines that although change in Turkish foreign policy 
towards Cyprus is mainly rhetorical, it will contribute to the formation of policy 
changes towards Cyprus. The Turkish accession process contributes to transforming the 
Cyprus dispute. In line with the Diez’s findings, the thesis concludes that the EU, 
through the carrot of  membership, has played a key role in the transformation of the 
Cyprus conflict, which has undergone a range of stages: from subordination conflict, 
which is a stage of greatest conflict intensity to identity conflict, which is the stage of 
lower intensity. Thus, the prospect of membership has provided the necessary incentive 
for the solution to the Cyprus dispute. 
However, the thesis demonstrated that credibility of EU rewards and threats has 
become influential in the “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus 
under the JDP government. After the EU failed to keep its promise of lifting the 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots once the Turkish Cypriots accepted the Annan Plan, 
even though the Greek Cypriots rejected it, credibility of the EU started to be 
questioned and the support given to EU membership started to decline. The JDP 
government has been accused of making concessions over the national security interests 
of Turkey in Cyprus for EU membership. As a result, domestic adaptation cost of the 
new Cyprus policy has increased dramatically. Thus, this has led to the reversal of a 
“Europeanized” discourse towards Turkey and has slowed down the “Europeanization” 
process in Turkey. In brief, the JDP government has been motivated to create a change 
in regarding the Cyprus dispute. The desire for EU membership has become the main 
driving force behind this change. Although the change remains solely rhetorical, the 
Cyprus case provides empirical evidence to the material interest argument.  
 However, this study opens the door for further studies with regard to the norm 
diffusion impact of European integration process on Turkish foreign policy towards 
Cyprus. Indeed, this study presents a comprehensive picture of materialistic calculations 
with certain implications on norm diffusion. Even though materialistic concerns 
dominate the mind and heart of the AKP government in relation to the Cyprus conflict, 
there is considerable room to discuss whether those materialistic concerns have become 
transformed in the direction of norm driven acts. Although this thesis touches upon 
whether there is elite socialization in Turkey towards Cyprus, whether European 
‘culture of conciliation’ has been adopted by the JDP government, and whether there is 
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change in identity-scripts of conflicting parties, it is necessary to conduct a deeper 
analysis over whether  the JDP government has developed a “Europeanized” discourse 
and “Europeanized” Cyprus policies only in order to be rewarded by EU membership or 
if the JDP government has accepted the EU as a valid “aspiration group” whose 
collective identity, values, and norms they share, whose recognition they seek, and to 
which they want to belong.
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